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APRIL, 1962

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Coming Next Month...

DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

May, 1962

The May, 1962, issue is devoted to a study of disarmament and coexistence in the hope that we can make some contribution to further public understanding of the vital problems involved. In this issue eight specialists discuss:

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A WORKABLE ARMS CONTROL PLAN by **Seymour Melman**, Associate Professor of Industrial and Management Engineering, Columbia University, and author of "The Peace Race";

U. S. CONCERNs AND FEARS OF THE SOVIET UNION by **Ross N. Berkes**, Director, School of International Relations, University of Southern California;

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THE DESTRUCTION POTENTIAL OF THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. by **Bernard K. Gordon**, Instructor in Political Science, Vanderbilt University;

THE NEGOTIATION OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION by **Laurence W. Martin**, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

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In the Middle East, "Disengagement bolstered by foreign aid and support of the United Nations as a stabilizing agency . . . appears to have been a satisfactory United States posture since 1958," writes Halford Hoskins, in the introductory article of this issue. He warns, however, that "none of the problems making for trouble in the area has been solved." In the articles that follow, these problems are carefully analyzed.

The United States Posture in the Middle East

By HALFORD L. HOSKINS

Senior Specialist in International Relations, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress

PRIOR TO World War II, the United States had little direct contact with the countries of the Middle East. The substantial share of Middle East Oil concessions acquired by American companies during the interwar period had required some support by the United States government on occasion, but the action then called for involved relations with European powers rather than with countries indigenous to the area in most instances. Since United States interests in the Middle East—communications, trade and political stability as well as oil—coincided in the main with those of Western European powers, they were generally served by proxy at that period.

World War II brought to the United States a new appreciation of the fact that among the costs of war may be the necessity for assuming unaccustomed responsibilities for the maintenance and protection of important interests abroad. After the war, the United States was identified less with the Western Hemisphere than with the West—a community of nations drawn together both by ideological concepts and by common reference to the North Atlantic basin. Implicit

in this altered relationship was the need for United States management of its own and other Western interests in the Middle East for the first time.

The waning of British and French influence in the Middle East, accelerated by the late war, coincided with signs of expansionism on the part of the Soviet Union. As early as April, 1946, an address by President Truman on Army Day called attention to the Middle East as containing "vast natural resources of enormous value" forming "an area of great strategic importance." Less than a year later, in addressing the Congress, his text was "a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

The emergency measures then taken by the United States to strengthen Greece and Turkey and to bolster Iran's flagging spirit were only the precursors of more studied policy decisions. Given the growing belief in Allied circles that the Soviet Union might be contemplating military moves toward Russia's traditional objectives in the Mediter-

ranean and Persian Gulf regions, the magnitude of the stakes of the Western world in that area inevitably led to the conclusion that bounds must be set to Soviet adventurism. The evolution of this "containment" concept, finding sanction in the United Nations Charter, can readily be followed in successive addresses and manifestos of the early post-war years.

The doctrine of containment as applied to Communist Russia after World War II was nothing new in international relations, for without very clear definition at times it had been at the base of British and West European policy with respect to Czarist Russia during a large part of the nineteenth century. As refurbished after 1945, it again provided a frame of reference for the formulation of policy by Western nations including the United States.

United States policy-making relative to the Middle East was tentative at first, partly because of unfamiliarity with situations in that area that had developed over a considerable period of time, partly because of prior interests of its allies, Great Britain and France. A broad basis for collaboration of the three powers existed in their common recognition that any comprehensive security scheme, such as that inaugurated by the North Atlantic Treaty, would call for the erection of an anti-Communist barrier in and beyond the Middle East. The declaration of May 25, 1950, in which the three powers declared their "unalterable opposition to the use of force . . . between any of the states of that area," was an initial step in that direction.

Beyond that point, however, genuine cooperation by the three powers largely ceased. With France desiring to recover lost prestige in the area and Britain striving to retain its residual footholds, government heads in Washington were addicted to the view that a normal and healthy development of the young Arab nations required the "orderly withdrawal" of Western supervisory authority from the area with all deliberate promptitude. Considerable insistence on this point of view, reinforced by nationalist intransigence in the Arab states themselves, resulted in the shrinkage of Western influence in the Arab countries more rapidly than their slowly growing strength and political sophistication could fill the resulting power vacuum.

The Arab States

In these circumstances, joint efforts to enlist the Arab states in a Western security system encountered such difficulties as to neutralize the advantages sought from the arrangement. It is true that the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization marked a forward step in the application of the containment principle. This move, however, achieved through the good offices of the United States, was one avidly sought by these exposed countries themselves. But attempts to link up the Arab states also in a Middle East Command or a Middle East Defense Organization only paved the way for the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal of September, 1955, and necessitated the amending of Western policy for the Arab Middle East just as success had been achieved in the erection of a northern tier containment barrier.

The Egyptian arms deal opened a new era of power politics in the Middle East—one in which the containment concept as applied to geographical boundary lines was no longer an adequate formula for the maintenance of security in the area. This became manifest when, early in 1956, the Western powers were considering implementing the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 to allay the danger of the resumption of war between Egypt and Israel. Taking the position that it possessed both real interests and recognized relationships in the area, the Soviet Union denounced the Tripartite Declaration and significantly asserted (February 13) "that the U.S.S.R. . . . deems it necessary to state that any action leading to complications in the area of the Near and Middle East . . . is bound to be the subject of a legitimate concern on the part of the Soviet Government." A reiteration of this challenge a few weeks later (April 17) elicited from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles only the response that "any genuine Soviet desire" to seek solutions through the instrumentality of the United Nations would "of course" be welcomed by the United States.

With this admission that the Soviet Union had become an arbiter of issues arising beyond the containment line in the Middle East, the limitations of the existing basic security concept were implicitly recognized.

In the absence of policy adapted to all contingencies, the relegating of controversial matters to the United Nations, where Free World counsels then prevailed, could be thought to afford time for their appraisal in the light of vital interests.

This outlook was soon subjected to test in consequence of President Nasser's sequestration of the assets and properties of the Suez Canal Company and his unilateral transformation of an international waterway into one subject to parochial control. During months of ensuing crisis, the United States employed its good offices in attempts to preserve the international status of the Suez Canal without resort to the use of force. Failing either to restrain an attack on Egypt by its allies or to insure that in future the Suez Canal would be "insulated from the politics of any country," United States authorities were confronted with the necessity of elaborating a policy for the Middle East consonant with external policy in general and commensurate with its considerably augmented responsibilities in that area. Experience gained during the 11 years since the close of World War II clearly pointed to the conclusion that, where vital interests are concerned, the application of policy by indirection yields certain kinds of advantage only so long as that technique can be afforded. By the close of 1956 the situation in the Middle East, where Western interests had reached a low ebb, appeared to call for a more dynamic policy directly applied.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

From these circumstances emerged the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine, given official form in House Joint Resolution 117 of March 9, 1957. "The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East," this document attested. It was considered that these interests could be upheld by preparedness to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations "requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism." No real change in United States foreign policy followed. Like the Truman Doctrine of a decade earlier, it represented one method of implementing the contain-

ment concept. It varied from the earlier pronouncement principally in the degree of determination expressed.

In practical terms, however, the policy thus boldly reaffirmed achieved little. In the first place, the formula proved to be too limited in its range of application. In the second place, it had scant appeal to the very states for whose security it was intended. Although given attractive packaging in offers of foreign aid, only one of the Arab states—Lebanon—found the doctrine officially acceptable. The demonstration of the United States Sixth Fleet off the port of Beirut in April, 1957, which may have prevented the rape of Jordan, was generally considered to be in keeping with the doctrine. But justification for the landing of United States forces at Beirut at the request of the Lebanese President in July, 1958, had to be sought under provisions of the United Nations Charter; it could not be shown that the threat to Lebanon's independence by the United Arab Republic came from a state controlled by international communism.

The difficulties encountered in finding a formula for the withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon added no luster to the Eisenhower pronouncement. While convinced that it had served a good purpose, President Eisenhower himself in fact helped to consign the doctrine to a kind of limbo. He expressed the view that steps to promote stability in the Middle East ought to be taken by the United Nations; "we would be prepared to go along with any decision of that kind," he said. In the event, escape from the predicament represented by the presence of more than 14,000 American military personnel in Lebanon with nothing to do was afforded by action taken during an emergency meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. Significantly, the achievement resulted not from the very sensible measures proposed by Secretary General Hammarskjold, nor from equally sound proposals by President Eisenhower, but from substantially similar measures introduced by the Arab countries themselves and so framed so as to be unanimously acceptable to the Assembly membership. The moral in this, dimly seen at first, became a lodestar to policy-making in succeeding years: with the prestige of two power blocs more or less in

balance in the Arab Middle East, any plan for the stabilization of the area, to be effective, must needs be acceptable to the dominant Arab states.

United States fence mending immediately after the Lebanese excursion followed familiar patterns. It included new bilateral agreements with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, the remodeling of the Baghdad Pact—after the withdrawal of Iraq—into a rather pallid form called Cento, and renewed emphasis on foreign aid. Fence mending was the more needed because of the continued erosion of Western influence in the area.

Several factors contributed to this. Neither France nor Great Britain had recovered much esteem among the Arab states after the Suez episode. France continued to earn disfavor from its actions in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, from its contributions to Israel's military establishment and, more specifically, from its participation in the erection of Israel's nuclear reactor. Britain's armed support of Jordan after the Iraq coup in 1958 and its prompt despatch of naval and military forces to Kuwait in response to Iraq's threat in the summer of 1961 gave fresh impulse to Arab memories of the years of British dominance in the area.

The United States was unavoidably caught up in situations of this nature. In Arab estimation, it was imperialist both by close association with these powers—notwithstanding its strong opposition to their Suez military adventure—and by its involvement in the extensive operations of its oil companies in Middle East fields. Its leading part in the extension of the Western alliance system into the Middle East was magnified in dislike because of the lack of cordiality subsisting between the Arab States and Turkey and Iran—dislike only slightly modified by United States avoidance of formal membership in the Baghdad Pact and its Cento restoration.

Soviet Advances

Certain achievements and postures of the Soviet Union have proved to be serious handicaps to United States efforts to care for "vital" interests in the area. While Western-sponsored alliances were creating apprehension in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Soviet Russia was combining a vigorous and far-reaching trade-and-aid program with a

diplomatic offensive. Within a brief space of years and by virtue of dozens of trade and payments agreements, the U.S.S.R. reached into nearly every part of the Middle East, including both Turkey and Iran, advancing credits, supplying military equipment and providing outlets for surplus local produce. Thus it opened up channels beyond those possessed by the United States for the penetration in depth of its political influence.

Developments of this nature combined with the moral influence of Soviet accomplishments in the exploitation of space and in the fabrication of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Meanwhile tactical and strategic bases for the Nato powers in the Middle East and North Africa were being progressively relinquished under pressure. Clearly there was a very critical need for a much more comprehensive basis of policy than that embodied in the original containment concept.

Israel and American Policy

One great and unwieldy obstacle, however, lay directly in the way of the devising of any basic policy formula sufficiently consistent and inclusive to enable the United States to compete for a position of strength in the Middle East on even terms with the Soviet Union. This obstacle was the peculiar relationship existing between the United States and the state of Israel. The encouragement of Zionist groups in the United States, the over-zealous recognition *de facto* of a Zionist state newly proclaimed but wholly lacking in essentials for viability, the provision of economic aid to Israel over a critical period and diplomatic support against certain Arab boycott measures never can be compromised, in Arab minds, by substantial monetary contributions to United Nations efforts to supply the minimum needs of a million Palestinian Arab refugees nor by mild disapproval of an armed Israeli attack on Egypt.

It is true, no doubt, that United States support of the forcible erection of the State of Israel in a formerly Arab land was less a matter of considered policy than of emotion welling up from historical background and from human sympathy for the Jews who had contrived to avoid extermination in wartime Central Europe. Yet the presence of Israel

in the heart of the Arab world is a fact of life. Moreover, there is scant evidence that the exigencies encountered by the United States in the conduct of foreign relations in the Middle East during the period since May 15, 1948, have wrought any appreciable change in the United States attitude toward Israel as an American protégé. It is highly significant that both candidates for the presidency of the United States in the latest campaign made a point of committing not merely their respective parties but the nation as a whole to continued support of Israel: the one (Nixon) asserting that "the United States is committed to the preservation of the independence of Israel" and the other (Kennedy) declaring that "friendship for Israel is not a partisan matter. It is a national commitment." Considering that, apart from Islamic faith, tradition and language, mortal enmity for Israel is the single factor which draws together all Muslim Arabs, it is inevitable that the United States is placed at a serious disadvantage in its competition with the free-lancing Soviet Union and understandable that policy-making has had to be confined for the most part to *ad hoc* decisions.

Reassessment

The upshot of the events of 1958 was a reassessment not so much of objectives as of implementing procedures. Presumably the United States has continued to regard as vital to the national interest the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East and confronted with the issue of armed aggression from a state controlled by international communism, it would be impelled to use armed force in defense of those nations. Experience had shown, however, that restraint of overt aggression alone would not necessarily prevent the eventual loss of the Middle East to the Communist sphere through other forms of penetration.

In the absence of a threat of armed aggression, therefore, the problem was that of finding means of dealing with subtler forms of Communist power and influence. In essence, the problem was one of discovering how to raise or how to preserve barriers in the minds of men—that is, how to promote resistance among the leading elements in


Middle Eastern countries to the blandishments of Communist powers.

This was a problem that applied very unevenly in different sectors of the Middle East area. It was of relatively small consequence in the countries of the "Northern tier" alliance where anti-American prejudice was slight and where neither threats nor friendly overture from Soviet Russia were likely to be taken at face value. Likewise in Jordan, which owed its continued existence to political and fiscal support from the West, and in oil-based Kuwait, whose independent survival depended on British protection, there was small likelihood of pro-Soviet leanings. Elsewhere in the area and especially in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, the United States was confronted with a task made much the more difficult by the handicaps alluded to above. In these countries, the avoidance of "strings" attached to proffers of aid could be expected to reduce dependence on Soviet aid provisions in some measure. Beyond that, authorities in Washington, with some trepidation, began to make a trial of disengagement from Arab politics.

Whereas at earlier stages in United States experience, neutralist tendencies in the leading Arab states were looked upon with considerable doubt and suspicion, the Arab formula of "positive" neutrality—that is, complete non-alignment with either great power system—could be seen to possess considerable virtue. Indeed, as the Nasser regime took vigorous steps to eradicate Communist activities within the United Arab Republic, thus earning a measure of Soviet disapproval, United States action in checking its allies bent on Nasser's overthrow in 1956 gained some belated justification. In Iraq also, where the Kassim regime once seemed to be on the verge of slipping entirely into the Soviet orbit, occasional backpedaling suggested that the British-American decision not to intervene at the time of the July coup had been indeed the lesser of alternate risks. Developments of this nature coming after the unhappy venture in Lebanon gave credence to the view that, in a world where miscalculations in foreign policy might so readily result in utter chaos, restraint may well be the better part of resolution in power diplomacy.

However attractive this line of reasoning

THE MIDDLE EAST



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may be to peace-loving Western powers, it most surely does not mark the end of the search for a policy formula adapted to exigencies bound to arise from time to time in the Middle East. Disengagement bolstered by foreign aid and support of the United Nations as a stabilizing agency in the area appears to have been a satisfactory United States posture since 1958. These have been abnormally quiet years, however, and—since none of the problems making for trouble in the area has been solved—the period of relative quiescence cannot reasonably be expected to continue indefinitely. The Arabs still anticipate the day when Israel can be eliminated and the refugees can go "home." A lively arms race between Israel and Egypt continues with the Soviet Union supplying the Nasser government with submarines, jet MIGs and other military equipment. Relations between Egypt and Iraq blow hot and cold. Jordan and Kuwait are marked for absorption by other states. Western oil companies fight losing battles to preserve their chartered interests. Even the Suez Canal question has not been laid to rest as has been indicated by Egypt's reported contemplation of denying the use of that waterway to the Netherlands—a Nato member—in support of Indonesia.

Any outbreak of violence in the Middle East could be a signal for further Soviet meddling. Assuming that in this nuclear age the Middle East interests of the United States and its Western allies still are to be

rated as of vital importance, this country will need to be prepared directly to assume commitments which may involve no less risk than those of the past. Risk, in any event, is an inevitable accompaniment of leadership in world affairs. Meanwhile, there is some ground for belief that, from widening experience and growing political sophistication, the maintenance of attitudes of "positive neutrality" by the leading Arab states tends somewhat to neutralize the presence of Soviet influence in the area.

In 1933, Halford L. Hoskins founded the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Medford, Massachusetts, and served as its dean for 11 years before setting up the School of Advanced International Studies and the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. He has been a student of the modern Middle East for a considerable span of years, traveled a great deal in the area and has studied manuscript records in the Citadel archives in Cairo. His writings include *British Routes to India* and *The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics*. He also initiated the *Middle East Journal*. Halford Hoskins is now Adjunct Professor in the School of International Service at the American University.

"Most countries have in their history experienced some form of feudal society, with wealth and power in the hands of the few. The most advanced countries have moved out of it; in many others it still prevails. This is one of the things which must disappear if there is to be economic progress in the modern sense. It can disappear under the guns of violent revolution, with the lives and property of those who have the most being forfeit. But the mass of people have never found quick prosperity through expropriation—through dividing up an inadequate pie. Grabbing the possessions of a few does not really help the many.

"But revolutions are likely to come unless those who have the wealth and power are prepared to cooperate in working out means whereby productivity can be increased and its benefits more widely distributed."—Robert L. Garner, President of the International Finance Corporation, in an address before the annual meeting of the Board of Governors, Austria, September 21, 1961.

"Thus far Syria's return to democratic constitutionalism has followed an orderly way," writes this specialist. He believes that "it would not be surprising that the army at this juncture sincerely intends to stay out of politics but has not stopped watching the political scene to prevent developments that would counter the initial purposes of the revolution."

Syria: A Crisis in Arab Unity

By GEORGE LENCZOWSKI

Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley

IN THE early hours of September 28, 1961, a group of officers holding key positions in the Syrian army carried out in Damascus a *coup d'état* which put an end to the Syro-Egyptian union. During the subsequent 48 hours, President Nasser of the United Arab Republic made two parallel attempts to save the union, by negotiation and by military action, both of which failed. Egyptian paratroops ordered to action in Latakia promptly surrendered to the Syrian army while Nasser called a halt to further military intervention. By the same token, resistance to the coup within Syria proved negligible and was limited to a few diehard elements soon to be overcome by the revolutionary troops.

The military group which executed the coup was neither large nor based on any broad ideological movement comparable to the Egyptian Free Officers organization. The Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command, as the *junta* styled itself, consisted of no more than seven or eight officers of colonel and major rank. It seems that the most impor-

tant role in this group—at least in the actual mechanics of the coup—was played by the commanders of the desert brigade and of the armored formation.

Following the coup, the *junta* called upon a civilian statesman, Dr. Maamoun Kuzbari, to assume the function of the acting head of state and government pending the restoration of the constitutional life in the country. The new government promptly reaffirmed Syria's independence and promised elections to a constituent assembly within four months. For a few weeks the provisional government and the Revolutionary Command existed side by side, the latter issuing statements and communiqués. In early December, however, the newly-appointed chief of the army staff, General Abdul Karim Zahreddin, declared that the army, having accomplished its task, was returning to the barracks. Thus, ostensibly at least, the officers withdrew from an active role in politics, recognizing the principle of civilian supremacy. Syria was reborn as an independent state, entering a new era of political and social development.

Syria's abrupt defection from the United Arab Republic came as a surprise and a shock to many Arabs and non-Arabs alike, who during the past few years were exposed to frequent assertions that unity was a cherished objective of the Arab masses and that union of Syria and Egypt, resulting from a voluntary act, was based on firm foundations. It is this writer's thesis, however, that many basic factors pointed to the likelihood of such a turn of events. The surprise element in the mechanics of the coup itself—a

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necessary corollary of a conspiracy against a dictatorship—should not be confused with the surprise regarding the process of political alienation and defection as a whole. The former by its very nature had to be unpredictable for the coup to succeed. The latter could be foreseen if due account was taken of the background and the workings of the Syro-Egyptian union.

The Background of the Union

Proclaimed on February 1, 1958, the Syro-Egyptian union was the result of several forces and factors at play in Syria, Egypt, and the Arab world as a whole. While the basic aspiration for unity could be traced back to the period of the Arab Awakening in the late nineteenth century and the subsequent developments during and after both world wars, it was the Palestine issue in 1948 which dramatized the need for unity in view of the dismal Arab failure in the diplomatic and military sectors. The lesson of Palestine clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of the Arab League as an effective instrument of coordinated Arab action. Furthermore, the traditional Arab leadership was discredited.

Before long, Syria and Egypt experienced political upheavals which brought to power a new generation of leaders. The new regime in Egypt was an expression of protest against the evils of the past: corruption, feudalism, backwardness and imperialism. The regime was not based on any clearly formulated ideology and while Nasser and his men knew what they were against, they had only a vague notion of the positive objectives to be attained. Yet even in those early phases certain basic assumptions could be discerned: imperialism owed its successes to Arab weakness; disunity in the Arab ranks was an important source of this weakness, hence it had to be eradicated. And Egypt was conceived as a center of three concentric circles, the Arab, the African and the Islamic.

Thus the need for unity and coordination was felt from the beginning. However, during the first three years of Nasser's regime, local Egyptian issues tended to overshadow the broader Arab ones. It was only in 1955 that Nasser embarked on what could be termed a truly pan-Arab career. A succession of international events helped him along this road. The Baghdad Pact, the Bandung

Conference, the Cairo-Moscow arms deal, the Aswan Dam controversy, together with the Suez war and—finally—the Eisenhower Doctrine created situations and issues which transformed his role from the purely Egyptian to all-Arab and eventually Afro-Asian as well. Between 1955 and 1957 Nasser passed through a variety of political and military crises from which he invariably emerged victorious, with his fame and prestige enhanced in the Arab world.

Of the various countries likely to be swayed by Nasser's struggles and successes, Syria stood in the forefront as most susceptible to his influence. This was so for three reasons: (a) as a country with a highly developed Arab consciousness, Syria was very sensitive to any manifestation of Pan-Arab leadership; (b) after the downfall of dictator Shishakli in 1954 she experienced a revival of political life which gave unlimited opportunities to those groups that advocated Arab unity; (c) despite her parliamentary democracy, Syria was not free from army intervention in politics, and the army tended to favor the pan-Arab and pro-Nasser orientation.

Among those who propagated the idea of Arab unity, the Arab Socialist Renaissance party (*Hizb al-Baath al-Arabi al-Ishtiraqi*) was most prominent in Syria. Formed in 1954 out of a fusion of the Socialist party and the Arab Renaissance party, the *Baath* (as it was known in popular abbreviation) was led by Akram Hourani, Michel Aflaq and Salaheddin al-Bitar. Its program called for Arab unity, socialism and democracy within the broader framework of the struggle against imperialism, Zionism, capitalism and feudalism. Inasmuch as Nasser of Egypt was gradually crystallizing his own ideology by calling for Arab unity and a "socialist, co-operative, and democratic society," the two platforms overlapped sufficiently to permit political cooperation.

Previously opposed to dictatorship, the *Baath* now "adopted" Nasser and, through this identification with Nasserism, made great strides in gaining adherents and neutralizing opposition. And conversely, Nasser found in the *Baath* valuable allies who, when needed, could throw their weight to prevent Syria from aligning herself with the West or joining hands with the Hashimite monarchy of Iraq.

In the multiparty system of Syria, the *Baath* has never been more than a vocal minority party. The number of its members was fairly limited and its main strength was based on students. However, assisted by the occult wielded by army officers and aggressive in its tactics and slogans, the *Baath* began to exert influence out of proportion to its real numbers. Furthermore, it established a tactical alliance with various other elements. The latter ranged all the way from unaffiliated pro-Nasser nationalists to the Communists and included opportunists (some of them wealthy politicians with no love for socialism) as well as sundry anti-Western individuals who found in *Baath*-sponsored activities an emotional release and vicarious fulfillment.

Despite the added strength that their "Popular Front" allies provided, the Baathists were represented by only 20 deputies in the 140-man parliament. The majority was composed of conservatives who owed allegiance either to the Aleppo-based People's party (*Hizb al-Shaab*) and the smaller National party (*Hizb al-Watani*), or to lesser parties and tribal groupings, or who were simply independent. However, with the passage of time, i.e., through the mid-1950's, the parliament was gradually subjected to the *Baath*- and Nasser-generated pressures from "the street" and its authority became eroded.

This, in turn, found its reflection in the composition of the cabinets. Whereas the first post-Shishakli cabinets were largely dominated by the People's party, in 1956 they gave place to a "national unity" cabinet, in which a Baathist held the portfolio of foreign affairs. It was symptomatic of the then prevailing trends that through the winter of 1956-1957 both the Jordanian and the Syrian foreign ministers were Baathists, i.e., men whose philosophy committed them to the abolition of the separate sovereignty of their respective countries. During that period the traditional moderate politicians on the Syrian scene were conceding ground to the younger leaders who knew how to manipulate the urban masses through well-coined slogans, uncompromising battering of adversaries, and emotional appeal.

Most important, however, was the ability of the *Baath* and its allies to monopolize Arab

nationalism for their own benefit. A series of equations was established: a true patriot must be an Arab nationalist; an Arab nationalist must believe in, and work for, the unity of the "Arab nation"; those who oppose the principle of Arab unity are traitors to the Arab cause; President Nasser and the *Baath* party work for Arab unity; *ergo* those who oppose Nasser and the *Baath* are traitors as well. Even if the latter was not articulated, it was implied. This kind of incessant propaganda produced two effects: a mass hypnosis especially noticeable among the urban groups and an intimidation of dissenters, i.e., of the majority of Syria's "natural" political leaders.

Once the equation of opposition to unity with treason was established, it was not too difficult for the *Baath* to attack its actual or potential adversaries. A victim of attack could be accused with relative impunity of all sorts of crimes in the Arab political vocabulary. He could be called an imperialist stooge, a feudal reactionary, a Zionist agent, or a member of an international anti-Arab conspiracy. A series of political trials between 1955 and 1957 based, first, on the murder of a popular officer, Colonel Adnan Malki, and then on the alleged discovery of the Iraqi and American plots to overthrow Syria's government, further enhanced the power of the *Baath* and of its military allies. By 1957 it became definitely unsafe to go on record opposing the *Baath* program and slogans.

Despite these successes, the Baathists realized that, in the long run, the forces opposing them in Syria were stronger than they. The conservative camp could be temporarily intimidated and silenced but it was not eliminated and, with the subsiding of effervescence caused by the political trials and other crises, it might stage a comeback. Moreover, the *Baath*'s Communist allies gave cause for concern inasmuch as they exploited the alliance for their own benefit without much scruple or restraint. As the year of 1957 drew to a close, and with the parliamentary election due in 1958, the fear of being squeezed between the forces of the Right and the Communists became prevalent among the *Baath* leaders.

There seemed only one way out of the dilemma: a speedy union with Nasser's Egypt, which would overwhelm the Right

and at the same time knock out their Communist competitors. Syria's conservatives had not yet fully recovered from the shock of the "Iraqi" and "American plot" trials and could be pushed into accepting the union with the partial aid of the argument that only Nasser could save Syria from communism. To persuade Nasser, however, proved a more difficult task. Egypt's president was not anxious to assume the added burden of governing the rather unruly Syrians, no matter how much committed he was to the slogan of Arab unity. Yet he could not oppose purely and simply the *Baath* initiative without losing face.

He could and did put some conditions, however. These were: (a) Syria was to abolish all political parties, i.e., to renounce its parliamentary system of government; (b) the new state was to have a unitary, not a federal, character. Although it meant the official dissolution of their party, the Baathists accepted the conditions. So did the rest of their cabinet colleagues in Damascus. On February 1, following the quasi-unanimous vote of the Syrian parliament (with a dissenting voice of the Communist deputy, Khaled Bagdash), the union of Syria and Egypt was officially proclaimed by Presidents Nasser and Kuwatly. The latter resigned from Syria's presidency and the United Arab Republic under Nasser's leadership came into being.

The Union in Operation

A plebiscite held on February 21, 1958, resulted in the approval of the union and the election of Gamal Abdel Nasser to the presidency of the Republic. On March 5, the president proclaimed a provisional constitution which confirmed the existing structure of power. The formal framework of government provided for the president with one or more vice-presidents, a union cabinet, and two provincial cabinets, to be called executive councils, for the Northern (Syrian) and Southern (Egyptian) Regions, respectively. Legislative power was to be vested in a National Assembly. However, the number of the members of the Assembly and their choice were to be determined by the president. As a minor concession to former parliamentarians the constitution enjoined that "at least half of the number of members must be

members of the former Syrian Chamber of Deputies and the National Assembly of Egypt." Furthermore, instead of providing for regular, automatically convened sessions, it gave the president the arbitrary power to convoke the Assembly and declare closure of its sessions at such times as suited his preference, as well as to dissolve it. In addition, the president was empowered to legislate by decree between the sessions of the Assembly.

The constitution made no mention of political parties but, implicitly, outlawed them. Instead, it provided for a single, government-controlled, political organization to be known as the National Union, the aim of which was "to work for the realization of national aims and the intensification of the efforts for raising a sound national structure from the political, social and economic viewpoints." "The manner in which the union is to be formed," added the relevant article, "shall be defined by Presidential decree."

Having thus formalized the essentials of his system, Nasser proceeded to build up a structure of power which would assure his full control over both regions of the republic. He was not unaware of the sense of loss and emptiness which many Syrians felt having sacrificed their sovereignty and democratic institutions on the altar of Arab unity. To counterbalance it, he went through formal motions of erecting the façade of equal partnership between Egypt and Syria and of recognizing Syrian autonomy in home affairs, despite the unitary character of the republic. Thus Syrians received two of the four vice-presidencies of the republic as well as a number of ministries in the union cabinet. By the same token, the Northern Region's Executive Council (cabinet) was composed entirely of Syrians.

In reality all vital decision-making was transferred to Cairo and concentrated in Nasser's own hands. His authority in Syria was exercised through three principal channels. The first was the group of *Baath* party leaders, which included Akram Hourani as vice-president of the U.A.R. (initially resident in Damascus) and several cabinet ministers. By replacing them in high positions, Nasser paid a debt to the group which had delivered Syria "on a silver platter." The second channel was the Syrian security organization headed by Colonel Abdul Hamid

Sarraj who was given the Ministry of Interior. Both channels represented an advantage in that an impression was created that Syrians were ruled by Syrians. The third method was to influence the governing of Syria indirectly and from behind the scenes by special Egyptian emissaries (such as General Mahmoud Riyad) and by a network of Egyptian agents gradually placed in a variety of civil and military functions.

Although Syria's bourgeoisie—traditionally the most powerful group in the country—was then deprived of political power and cowed into obedience (which it was expected to acknowledge with cheerful enthusiasm), its potential nuisance value and power of recuperation was not entirely overlooked by Nasser. That this class was restless and frustrated there was no doubt. The bourgeoisie not only mourned the loss of independence; it also resented the agrarian reform law decreed for Syria on November 26, 1958, and feared the possible unification of economies and currencies with the inevitable lowering of Syria's standard of living to the Egyptian level. Furthermore, it strongly disapproved of the recklessness of Nasser's Pan-Arab offensive, which found its culmination in the Lebanese civil war and the Jordanian crisis of mid-1958 and which threatened to engulf the Arab East into chaos and foreign military intervention.

The "Little Father"

Notwithstanding these adverse reactions, Nasser enjoyed a measure of psychological advantage by being personally remote from the scene and seeing the blame heaped upon his underlings—the Baathists and Colonel Sarraj—rather than on himself. In this respect his position was not unlike that of the tsar of Russia—a benevolent "little father" who stood above the pettiness and cruelty of his secret police and bureaucracy. By restricting his contact with the Syrians to an occasional triumphal tour of the country and friendly audiences granted to Syrian chambers of commerce or other professional groups, he generated a modicum of optimism and confidence likely to muffle the bourgeoisie's grumblings of discontent.

Yet this game of make-believe could not continue indefinitely without producing dangerous strains. By the fall of 1959, the situ-

ation in Syria was so tense, partly as a result of hasty and vindictive application of the agrarian reform by Baathist ministers, that Nasser decided to resort to his first major "surgical operation." In a succession of swift moves he purged the Syrian apparatus of the Baathists while sending to Damascus his trusted friend, Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer, U.A.R. vice-president, as special representative with full powers of legislation and executive decision. By doing so Nasser hoped to accomplish two objectives: to achieve a *modus vivendi* with the Syrian bourgeoisie and to destroy the *Baath* whose continuous existence as an autonomous political organization represented a threat to his monopoly of power. One of the first moves of Marshal Amer was to reassure Syria's business and landowning groups that the abuses of the agrarian reform would be curbed and corrected and that no hasty attempt would be made to unify the Syrian and Egyptian economies.

These measures represented a modicum of political success. Many conservative Syrians hailed Nasser's wisdom while rejoicing at the discomfiture and humiliation of the *Baath*. Moreover, Communist excesses under General Kassim's regime in the neighboring Iraq led them to accept Nasser's rule of Syria as a lesser of the two possible evils. Thus, although the Syrian bourgeoisie was not won over to the idea of union, it was at least psychologically neutralized.

This neutralization, however, was not destined to last long. On the one hand the Communist threat in Iraq seemed to recede with the rather strong anti-Communist measures taken by General Kassim in 1960. On the other, the very dynamics of reformist dictatorship, such as existed in Egypt, did not permit of a prolonged period of stabilized *status quo*. Police controls tended to become more efficient, bureaucracy more cumbersome, and the leadership more in need of spectacular gestures to compensate for the loss of liberties and economic austerity.

Thus, inevitably, the process of alienation between Cairo and the Syrians resumed its course. While during Amer's mission to Damascus in 1959 the radical-reformist features of the union regime were carefully played down, in 1960–1961 increasing emphasis was placed on the equation of union

with revolution. Cairo's propaganda began harping on the theme that by uniting with Egypt Syria received the blessings of the Egyptian revolution. The definition of treason was thus enlarged: it encompassed not only opposition to union but also resistance to the forceful measures of economic regimentation which the regime began applying with increasing vigor.

Economic Regimentation

Under the circumstances, the launching, first, of the National Union (single party) and then of the National Assembly, in the early summer of 1960, proved meaningless in terms of democracy. The two bodies served merely as one-way channels of persuasion and indoctrination between the government and the masses. The growing radicalism of the regime found its apogee, in July and August of 1961, when, on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the revolution, President Nasser issued a series of decrees nationalizing all banks and insurance companies, together with the majority of bigger companies, and, in a variety of ways, subjected the U.A.R.'s economy to stringent controls.

At the end of August he also abolished the regional executive councils (i.e., Syrian and Egyptian cabinets) while enlarging the union cabinet as a single central executive authority. Furthermore, always anxious to prevent the rise of autonomous political forces, he deprived Colonel Sarraj (by then Syrian premier and interior minister) of his functions by elevating him to the sinecure of the vice-presidency in Cairo. Needless to say, Sarraj was shocked and unhappy about his master's change of heart and, after a few days of aimless existence in the union capital, tendered his resignation and returned to Damascus. His displacement and quarrel with Nasser made him lose, momentarily, his grip on the Syrian security organization which was his own creation and his source of strength. It gave the long-awaited opportunity for a group of anti-union army conspirators to strike. This, as we have seen, they did in a bold move on September 28, 1961.

The provisional government of Maamoun Kuzbari as well as the Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command began their careers by

issuing declarations in which they explained and justified separation from Egypt to the public of Syria. The cabinet's explanations could be summed up as follows: Syrians believed in and did their utmost to achieve Arab unity. However, the rulers of Egypt abused their confidence and exploited the union for selfish purposes. Instead of co-operating and consulting on the basis of equality, they acted arbitrarily, imposing their will, restricting freedom, establishing a police state and ruining Syria's economy. In their perversion of the ideal they turned a deaf ear to Syrian pleas for justice and moderation. There was no way left for Syrians but to rise and restore their constitutional liberties. Syria, however, remained faithful as ever to the ideal of Arab unity, which she proposed to promote to the best of her ability.

As for the Revolutionary Command, it issued some 25 communiqués, in which it traced the developments of the revolution, explaining the abortive negotiations with Marshal Amer, and clarifying the reasons that prompted it to action. The Egyptians, said one major communiqué, attempted both to dominate the Syrian army and to make it incapable of effective action. Under the guise of technical experts, Egyptian officers served in intelligence capacities spying on their Syrian comrades. They disregarded proper channels and communicated directly with the Cairo headquarters above the heads of their nominal Syrian superiors. Some of them possessed secret radio transmitters while others were found to have large bank accounts in Damascus for the ultimate purpose of demoralizing the Syrian officer corps.

Personal morality of these pseudo-experts and their professional standards were often below those of the Syrians. Syrian officers were being transferred, under the pretense of phony promotion, to remote posts in Egypt, where they were cut off from any influence upon the army. Last but not least, the Egyptian army command made an attempt to transfer secretly to Egypt sizeable quantities of ammunition and certain specialized weapons from Syria. All of this prompted the Syrian army to strike at the tyranny in defense of honor, freedom and Arabism.

Added to these statements was a lengthy memorial released by the Syrian chambers

of commerce in which the deplorable economic situation of the country—the flight of capital, devaluation of currency, and general stagnation—was vividly depicted and laid at the door of Egyptian mismanagement.

Kuzbari's provisional cabinet was largely non-partisan and, aside from the premier, had only two well-known political figures. Although pledged to hold elections to the Constituent Assembly in four months, the government decided to advance the date and hold them instead in early December, no doubt with an eye to capitalizing on the people's as yet undiluted enthusiasm over the regained freedom. In early November the government issued an electoral law calling for a parliament of 172 members (156 Muslims and 16 Christians) which would also act as a Constituent Assembly. Having issued these decrees, the cabinet resigned and was replaced by an *ad interim* cabinet of Issat al-Nuss, composed of higher civil servants and non-political figures to assure the impartiality of the elections.

Voting took place in early December and, although the union regime's formal ban on political parties had not yet been removed, it was not difficult to identify various competing groups as affiliated to the main pre-union political parties. By and large, the elections resulted in the victory of the moderately conservative elements. The single strongest group was that of the pre-union People's party in coalition with the right wing of the National party and sundry allied politicians. Their victory was, as could be expected, most decisive in Aleppo. In the parliament they emerged as a powerful bloc of about 80 deputies. The Baathists and their other Socialist allies suffered defeats in most of the constituencies except for Hourani's home town, Hama, where his slate of candidates—seven in all—won despite fierce opposition of their conservative adversaries. In the new parliament the Socialist bloc could count on 25 to 30 deputies. The remainder were divided into a tribal group, an Islamic faction, a group following former premier Khaled al-Azm, and various independents. The general trend—with the exception of the above-mentioned Socialist minority—was moderately conservative.

* Maamoun Kuzbari was elected speaker by substantial majority.

The New President

The first major point on the agenda of the Assembly was to elect the president of the republic.* The choice fell on Nazem al-Qudsi of Aleppo, former premier of pre-union days and a foremost leader of the old People's party. He was elected by a virtually unanimous vote after his only serious rival, Khaled al-Azm, withdrew his candidacy. After about a week of consultations with political leaders, Qudsi called upon his fellow Aleppian, Maaruf Dawalibi, to form the government. As one of the most prominent leaders of the People's party, Dawalibi, himself a former premier, was known for his strength and courage and as such was the rather logical choice for premiership. The cabinet he formed on December 22 reflected the principal orientation of the parliament. His fellow Populists were given the key positions of Interior and Defense, thus assuming the dominant position in the cabinet. Other elements were also invited to join. The Socialists, however, were excluded.

It could be assumed that the policy to be followed by the new government would not deviate in its essentials from that pursued by Kuzbari's provisional administration. The latter had made it clear that it would aim at a definite liberalization of the economy compatible with the public welfare. In the field of foreign policy, Kuzbari's government had sought to reestablish good relations with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, i.e., all those countries with which, under Nasser's leadership, relations had seriously deteriorated. Most noteworthy was the rapprochement with Kassim's Iraq, which found its expression in the mutual visits of cabinet-rank missions and the conclusion, on November 3, of an economic agreement.

When, on January 8, 1962, Premier Dawalibi delivered his first ministerial declaration to the Assembly, he followed in broad lines the course set by his predecessors. His declaration dwelled at length on the problems of national economy. Far-reaching relaxation of controls and encouragement of free enterprise was promised. Furthermore, there was an intimation that some business firms seized by the union regime would be de-nationalized. The agrarian reform would be implemented but with the

revision of some of its unjust and impractical provisions.

However, the statement made it clear that the rights acquired by the workers and peasants as a result of previous reform legislation would not be taken away. The national economy was to follow a pattern of freedom under sound "socialism." As for the political regime, Syria was committed to full restoration of constitutionalism and the task of the Assembly would be to decide whether to restore the old constitution of 1950, to modify it, or to replace it.

Although the cabinets of the new Syria avoided a policy of mass reprisals toward the collaborators of the union regime, some of the latter's most notorious figures, such as Colonel Sarraj and his security chief General Mohammed Jarra, were placed under arrest pending an investigation of their acts and doings. Already during the ministry of Kuzbari a special commission of inquiry had been set up to collect evidence about the abuses and crimes of the union regime's principal henchmen. This evidence was to be turned over to the judicial authorities for further action.

Thus far Syria's return to democratic constitutionalism has followed an orderly way. The Revolutionary Command ceased issuing statements and orders, thereby withdrawing from open intervention in public affairs. It is premature to judge at this point how genuine or how complete this withdrawal has been. It would not be surprising

that the army at this juncture sincerely intends to stay out of politics but has not stopped watching the political scene to prevent developments that would counter the initial purposes of the revolution.

By detaching herself from Egypt, Syria has lived through a drama rarely occurring in the annals of history, namely, massive return of her former political leaders to power. These men had suffered a seemingly irrevocable eclipse in their careers with the advent of the union, although many of them were in their prime. Union with Egypt gave them a traumatic experience which they are not likely to forget. They seem determined never again to capitulate. The composition of the newly elected Assembly as well as that of Dawalibi's cabinet reflect these trends.

By any standards, Syria has now a strong government based on a seemingly stable majority in the parliament. Barring army interference and foreign-supported subversion, this government should be in a position to steer the country upon the new path of democracy and development. Its task is not easy, however, because to undo some of the acts and *faits accomplis* of the union regime will require more than usual skill, caution, and courage. The problem for the returned leaders is not merely to restore the *status quo ante*, but to act with a bold vision toward the creation of a society free of the vices which breed demagogues and extremists.

"In this age of fast-moving science and technology—an age that may be of evolutionary significance as a transitional period—it is important that the structure of our civilization be safeguarded by standards of value judgment that are adequate to present and future needs. A fundamental dichotomy of life philosophy now divides mankind into two major groups: materialists and idealists. Representation of both views is found in all communities, though only the East gives political and creedal importance to the choice. * * * *

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"We can no longer be apathetic to the problem of materialism which has widely proclaimed its militant program: the conquest of men's minds. Mere shrugging off the crass aspects of materialism as contrary to an ill-defined attitude—'the democratic way of life'—will not suffice. In view of the global dangers created by science and the heightened responsibilities thereby incurred, a middle neutral course is not possible. Needed is a positive affirmation of the world view on which we propose to meet the problem and chart our course."—Francis O. Schmitt, Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 8, 1961.

In an analysis of Israeli development in the last 14 years, this writer observes that "it is indeed paradoxical that at the very time when Israel's international position in the Middle East has become relatively more secure her domestic political and economic situation is steadily worsening."

Israel: The Continuing Struggle

By DWIGHT J. SIMPSON

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OVER the long run (if one may use the term with reference to a nation not yet 14 years old) the trial and conviction of Adolf Eichmann may prove to have been the most significant event in the State of Israel's history. In a certain sense the Eichmann trial was a catalyst that has greatly succeeded in welding together in a manner hitherto unknown the diverse remnants of Jewry comprising Israel's population. Prior to the trial both the Sabras (native-born Israelis) and the Oriental Jews (from Africa and Asia) had had no first-hand knowledge of and (worse yet in the view of the European-born Israelis) shockingly little interest in the holocaust visited upon the Jews by Hitler. For several years past it was felt by the older generation of European Jews, of which Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion is both the symbol and leader, that such ignorance and apathy would weaken or even undermine the foundations of the young state. Without a clear perception of the significance and implications of Hitler's "Final Solution," reasoned Ben-Gurion, no Israeli could properly understand Zionism and, the *raison d'être* of the Israeli state.

Consequently, in one of modern history's

most ironic twists, Eichmann, the nemesis of the Jews, was made to serve as a terrible unifier of the Jewish state, as his escaped victims triumphantly turned the tables on the persecutor. The lesson of the trial was agonizingly plain: as long as the germ of anti-Semitism infects the world body politic, "Final Solutions" and Eichmanns are possible; against such obscenities the only sure defense is the bastion and refuge of an independent Jewish state. Moreover, the trial was not without far-reaching international repercussions: the world was again reminded, vividly and graphically, of the savagery of the Nazis and the reminder was quite naturally linked in the minds of both the grief-stricken and the conscience-stricken with the thought that the survivors of such horrors merited, indeed deserved, a liberal measure of foreign financial and diplomatic support. Consequently, in the face of these seemingly beneficial results, those in Israel and abroad who had early misgivings about the advisability of Eichmann being tried in Israel—misgivings concerning Eichmann's abduction in Argentina by Israeli agents, the complicated aspect of legal *ex post facto* (Eichmann's activities preceded the existence of any Israeli statutory code), and the openly propagandistic nature of the trial itself—were forced to concede that, from the Israeli viewpoint, the benefits outweighed the shortcomings.

Thus equipped with a newly found sense of unity and enjoying a relatively better international position, Israel in 1962 was also able to look with far greater equanimity at the fast changing panorama of Middle Eastern politics. Indeed for the first time in recent history the view from the Israeli per-

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spective was comparatively pleasant. The swift and almost bloodless revolt in Damascus, which demolished the United Arab Republic and restored an independent Syria, has had the most profound impact on the whole political structure of the Middle East. At least for the near future, Pan-Arabism, by which was usually meant a united Arab nation embracing the Middle East from Casablanca to the Persian Gulf, is a dead letter.

Threat of Pan-Arabism

Moreover, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, the driving force of Pan-Arabism as well as the most truculent Arab opponent of Israel, has suffered a great personal setback and there is ample ground for doubting his ability to continue as head of the Cairo government. But even if President Nasser survives politically it is reasonably clear that Cairo will encounter increasing difficulties in maintaining its former position of dominance in the Arab world. The center of gravity in Arab politics is noticeably shifting from the Nile northward to Damascus and Baghdad. Indeed the next bid for leadership in a united Arab world may well come from General Abdel Karim Kassim in Baghdad by means of an attempted revival of some variation of the old Fertile Crescent scheme linking Iraq, Syria and Jordan.

In the short run all these political changes may produce an immediate danger to Israel. For it has been Israel's bitter experience in the Middle East that when Arab political leaders quarrel they often compete for Arab public opinion by warlike gestures against Israel. This could mean that the Syrians, who were the first to send troops against the new State of Israel in 1948, may feel constrained to establish new credentials as Arab patriots by resuming shellfire and border incursions along Israel's Huleh Valley frontier. But, on the other hand, there is now far less long-range danger of a major coordinated military attack on Israel's northern and southern frontiers by a United Arab army arising simultaneously in Cairo and Damascus.

Here it is useful to recall that Israel's ill-fated invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in 1956 came almost immediately after President Nasser had united the armies of Syria and Egypt under one command. Then, Israel

reasoned, the immediate potential danger was so grave as to require aggressive action. Now, however, Israel can breathe a little easier as her leaders contemplate the political ruins of a demolished U.A.R. and at least a momentary reversal of the trend toward Pan-Arab unity. This result, moreover, is a considerable vindication of the several foreign policy advisers surrounding Prime Minister Ben-Gurion who have long argued that Arab "unity" was a hollow concept, based as it was almost entirely on a shared Arab antipathy to Israel. And in light of recent events it now seems far more plausible to argue that Arab hostility to Israel, although still extant and still capable of arousing mass emotions, cannot indefinitely override important divisive influences within the Arab world of an economic, political or regional nature.

Israel has a further reason for increased equanimity regarding Middle Eastern politics: with the help of France, Israel has built and is now operating successfully a natural uranium reactor with a declared capacity of 24,000 thermal kilowatts. According to the best American estimates, such a reactor would be capable of producing enough plutonium for atomic bombs within two years. Secondly, Israel during 1961 completed successful tests of solid fuel rockets and is actively at work perfecting more advanced designs, the projected "Shavit 4" being a four-stage model. The existence of Israel's nuclear reactor, which had been secretly built in the desert near Rishon le Zion, became generally known only after the American Central Intelligence Agency reported the matter to the State Department. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has made the expected denials of any military purpose for either the reactor or the rockets but quite obviously the surrounding Arab states have been left free to draw their own conclusions. Consequently, the controlling and crucially important facts of the matter are that in mid-1962, due to the collapse of the U.A.R. and the beginning growth of what might become a potentially overpowering Israeli military superiority, Israel's position in the Middle East has reached a new level of security.

Comparable progress toward unity and security, however, has not been achieved in the turbulent area of Israeli domestic politics.

Indeed Israel's politics have verged dangerously close to a "politics of stalemate" and this exactly at a time when political dynamism is manifestly necessary in the country's struggle for survival. Always complicated, party politics in Israel, resting as they do on an increasingly delicate balance struck among factions and sub-factions, has begun to resemble a maze in which the doughty old warrior Ben-Gurion appears trapped, unable to find a path forward and unwilling to take the path of retreat. Superficially examined, nothing much seems changed: the long-familiar faces are all at their political posts and everything seems to be functioning as before. Actually, however, a subtle shift of forces has occurred that bears with it the potential capacity to deflect the entire course of Israeli politics.

Domestic Turbulence

The general elections for the fifth *Knesset* (Parliament), held in August of 1961, showed few apparently significant electoral developments since the previous balloting of 1959. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's Mapai party, with 42 out of the 120 seats, remains the strongest party, but it lost a crucial five seats to the centrist Liberals and the extreme left-wing Ahdut Avoda and the Communists. In the new *Knesset* the Liberals and the right-wing Herut party have 17 seats each, the Mizrahi bloc 12 and the Mapam 9. The fact that the only gains among the larger of the minor parties were made by the Liberals, who controlled 14 seats in the fourth *Knesset*, illustrates clearly the intense party loyalty of the Israeli voters as well as the increasing rigidity of the Israeli party system.

The election was contested principally upon the Mapai party's record of development and the problem of increasing standards of living. However, the notorious "Lavon Affair," the running battle between Ben-Gurion and ex-Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon, had in fact been the immediate cause of the Government's resignation. This affair has two principal ingredients: attempts to fix political responsibility for the disastrous failure of an Israeli-sponsored espionage ring uncovered in Cairo in the mid-1950's and the shrill quarrel over the kind and degree of socialism Israel should imbibe. These in-

flammatory issues evoked the sharpest electoral differences. For the moment the battle over the "Lavon Affair" seems to have been won by Ben-Gurion, but many observers feel that by winning the battle with Lavon Ben-Gurion may have lost the war. Certainly it seems clear that Ben-Gurion and his Mapai party can afford no more such costly "victories."

Ben-Gurion's Problems

The main bases of the Mapai's political support are the newly-prosperous Israeli working class, the large communities of recent immigrants and the *Kibbutzim* (the agricultural settlements). The Liberals achieved their gains by making substantial inroads into the rapidly growing Israeli middle class while the extreme left-wing parties mustered strong support among the Arab community which comprises about 250,000 or 15 per cent of the population. As if further to demonstrate Ben-Gurion's inability to gather additional electoral strength, even the relatively impotent Mapam party increased its popular vote, primarily at the expense of Ben-Gurion's Mapai. Apart from the obvious fact that political power in Israel is now evenly diffused among several political parties which find coalition government an increasingly difficult matter of agreement, the political picture seen from another angle is even darker for Ben-Gurion.

His Mapai party, like any party in a democratic country, must cater to the needs and desires of its supporters. However, the Israeli working class is primarily interested in higher wages, rapidly elevated living standards and a high volume of imported consumers goods for personal consumption. Recent immigrants (mostly Oriental Jews) demand publicly built housing at cheap rentals, equal employment opportunities and investments in education to narrow the gap in living standards and status between themselves and the rest of the population. Finally, the *Kibbutzniks* (members of the agricultural settlements) require a costly expansion and strengthening of the whole Kibbutz movement. To deliver all these demands means that at best Ben-Gurion, who is in his mid-70's and aging rapidly, will have to run twice as hard merely to stay in the same extremely precarious political position.

"Running twice as hard" in this sense means finding an ever-increasing amount of credit and investment capital to satisfy his constituents' heavy demands. And even the most optimistic of the Government planners in Jerusalem are prepared to concede that there is a definite limit to the amount of available funds, a limit that probably has already been reached.

Little wonder that Ben-Gurion branded the election result "a national calamity." However, with his usual exercise of hyperbole, Ben-Gurion was somewhat wide of the mark. Doubtless the already difficult political situation in Israel has been made more difficult by the election results, but the only immediate "calamity" has been to Ben-Gurion's personal political fortunes. Far from increasing or even maintaining his political power as he had hoped, he now has drastically less room for maneuver. Barring the kind of "miracle" he has achieved in the past, Ben-Gurion may become a captive of the now numerically important *Knesset* opposition.

Native Arab Unrest

Nearly all of Israel's domestic problems have significant international overtones and the position of Israel's native Arab population is no exception. In the autumn of 1961, massive and widespread unrest among Israel's Arabs erupted in a prolonged series of demonstrations, many of which resulted in open clashes between Arab demonstrators and the Israeli police. These ugly incidents were touched off by the killing of five Arab youths by an Israeli Army patrol on the Egyptian border. But the profound underlying causes were the bitter Arab resentment of military rule imposed on several primarily Arab districts, the attendant curfew and travel restrictions, the extreme difficulty of finding suitable jobs at wage rates paralleling those of Jewish workers, and the Government's concerted effort, in the name of "development," to appropriate their lands. Arabs in Israel are indubitably second class citizens and the prospect of a seeming permanence of this status has begun to arouse active resistance.

Moreover, Arab discontent, which was apparent in the Communist electoral gains made in their constituencies, has succeeded

also in dividing important sectors of Jewish opinion in Israel and certain sectors of world public opinion as well. A recent public manifesto decrying Israeli treatment of Arabs was signed by the legendary and much-revered philosopher Martin Buber and by other distinguished members of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Although specifically directed to the Ben-Gurion government, the manifesto has had a great and considerably divisive impact on a far wider audience of Israeli public opinion. Moreover, the heightening tensions in the Arab sectors are causing grave concern to the Government, which fears that neighboring Arab states may find an excuse to show their desire for Arab unity by serious anti-Israel action along Israel's borders or by means of a new diplomatic offensive in the United Nations.

The Immigration Problem

Added to the native Palestinian Arabs who remain unwilling and unassimilated elements of the Israeli population are the great social and economic problems posed by the recent Jewish immigration. During 1961 the millionth immigrant to come to Israel since the establishment of the state in 1948 arrived in Tel Aviv. Although these million immigrants came from 79 different countries, well over half of them came from the Arab countries of Africa and Asia. In recent years, for instance, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria have been the source of tens of thousands of newcomers. In spite of many public statements by Israeli government officials suggesting that these Oriental Jewish immigrants are being rapidly absorbed into the country's social and economic fabric, a recent authoritative field study by Dr. Isidor Lubin, an American economist and consultant for the Jewish Agency for Israel, suggests that much of the opposite is true.

Dr. Lubin, who is the Vanderbilt Professor of Public Affairs at Rutgers University, presented an embarrassing amount of evidence to show that the Israeli government's record on this score is very mixed. Specifically Lubin cited the fact that over 40,000 immigrants still are living in *ma'abaroth* (temporary settlement camps) and that many had done so "for as long as eight

years." He also pointed out that Israel had 485 immigrant villages containing 32,000 farm units and 130,000 people who are unable to attain economic self-sufficiency because of a serious lack of agricultural resources including tools, seed, livestock and know-how. Indicating that curtailment of immigration might be both necessary and desirable, Lubin concluded his report with the flat assertion that the needs of Israel's immigrants "cannot be overstated" and that "even after making allowances for the large funds that have come in from abroad, there are yet too many people requiring assistance." Taken as a whole, the Lubin report, precisely because of its sobriety and accuracy, is an ominous foreboding of the massive problems with which the politically hamstrung Ben-Gurion government will have to wrestle.

In the face of these facts, the continued, even stepped-up, encouragement of more immigration on the part of Israeli government officials, if understandable on politico-religious grounds, is surely an affront to the most elementary principles of economics. Beginning in December of 1960 with a meeting of the World Zionist Congress in Jerusalem, pro-immigration propaganda has been intensified. The Congress issued a strongly worded appeal to Jews throughout the world to come to Israel for the good of both the country and themselves. Addressing the same meeting, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was far more blunt: Jews throughout the world were obligated to emigrate to Israel and those Jews who continued to live elsewhere were "considered to have no God."

Whatever the reasons for this insulting outburst, it was soon plain that Ben-Gurion had over-reached himself and it was not long before several "explanatory" statements emerged from Jerusalem, apparently hopeful of quieting the storm of protest that swept through international Jewry. Consequently, Ben-Gurion soon withdrew from the dispute, leaving his lieutenants to make what amounts to the same point, if in more circuitous language.

Foreign Minister Golda Meir at a Madison Square Garden rally expressed the hope that Israel would receive an additional one million immigrants by 1970 and declared Israel's readiness to accept all Jews "even if

they should come in great and overwhelming numbers." Mrs. Meir's statement was later echoed by Finance Minister Levi Eshkol at a meeting of 400 Jewish leaders assembled at New York's Commodore Hotel. Yet early in 1961 Major General Haim Laskov, former Israeli Chief of Staff, declared in New York that 320,000 immigrants had still not been absorbed and were causing a serious social and economic problem.

In spite of this rather awesome fact, General Laskov went on to appeal for more funds for yet more immigrants. He outlined in some detail the facts that Israeli cities are faced with major slum area problems and that the general economy had yet to absorb 400 rural settlements. According to the General, American Jews "must continue to share in the overwhelming financial burden required to give the immigrants the means of a full and independent life" for "Israel's people can't possibly do this job alone." Thus is modern history treated to the spectacle of responsible officers of a government making impassioned pleas for immigration which they openly concede they are unable to sustain financially and which runs the serious risk of bankrupting an already fragile economy. If common sense has not been entirely abolished in Jerusalem then surely some future Israeli government will find the courage to reverse this grotesque policy.

Indeed if one wished to bear responsibility for a poor joke, one might describe the present general state of the highly vulnerable Israeli economy as being "all heel and no Achilles." Certainly it seems true that the economy is drifting, nearly out of control, with the helmsman unable or unwilling to change course. The brief period of stability achieved in late 1959 and early 1960 is now definitely over. In the year from June, 1960, to June, 1961, the general price level rose unchecked and the total increase in the revised cost of living index was 10 per cent. In the same period the public's money supply rose by 20 per cent, indicating that the Government had begun to resort to the printing press as an economic device. Consequently, by election time in August of 1961 there were widespread fears that the Israeli pound would be devalued, since it was by then manifest that the Israeli monetary unit was now

ludicrously overpriced. Rumors and prophecies of impending devaluation had indeed been current throughout the preceding year and most analysts figured that a decision to devalue would be taken in mid-summer, the traditional high point for annual foreign exchange reserves because of income from tourism. Public concern verged on panic and there was a wild spending spree that further stoked the fires of inflation.

The arguments stressing the necessity for currency devaluation as the necessary first step toward thoroughgoing economic reform are linked to the frightening problem of the rapidly increasing trade deficit. Indeed, the trade deficit continues to grow unchecked. In the first six months of 1961 Israel's imports were \$285 million compared with \$235 million in the corresponding period of 1960. Exports in this same period of 1961 were \$134 million, causing the so-called "trade gap" to widen by 25 per cent to reach \$151 million.

At the same time, however, the long present danger signals were still being ignored:

German reparations are practically at an end; contributions from abroad have levelled off; exports increase slightly and imports grow by leaps and bounds; the currency is unrealistically valued; and domestic inflation is rampant. Moreover, the list of Israel's unsolved economic problems has grown rather than shrunk in the past few years.

Consequently, it is indeed paradoxical that at the very time when Israel's international position in the Middle East has become relatively more secure, her domestic political and economic situation is steadily worsening. Factors outside Israel's control were primarily responsible for Israel's improved international position. But it must be recognized that bad planning and poor leadership lie at the root of her domestic problems. Over the former, external factors, Israel cannot hope to exert any great amount of control. For the latter, however, some amount of time still remains during which Israeli leadership, equipped with courage and determination, can begin providing workable solutions. But surely time is fast running out.

"Lest some say we meet to tilt at windmills as the world teeters on the brink of war, and that no useful purpose can be served by this great Conference of the leading lawyers of Asia, let me first state why we are here and the practical value of our work.

"We here set our minds to the task of creating a better legal basis for the operation of the world community. Despite ominous moves in the ever accelerating arms race, it is not too late to turn the drift of events away from world holocaust and into an all-out effort to create a peaceful world ruled by law—a world in which any man can walk anywhere on the face of the earth in freedom, in dignity and in peace. A world where the fate of humanity is controlled by law rather than force.

"Out of great crises great advances can sometimes result. If we use this crisis to awaken mankind to what law can do for the world we will give great impetus to world peace. We must by public education, explanation, and persuasion convince the people of the law's practical value in the current crisis. Thereby we will engender a sense of public urgency and support for the idea of a 'law-ful' world. The absolute necessity of nations turning to the law for decision of their quarrels rather than resort to arms is today dramatically underscored. Organized law must replace organized war. With nations possessing power to destroy not only the disputing nations but all mankind, the law program we are here to develop and implement is the imperative of our day."—Charles S. Rhyne, *Past President of the American Bar Association, in an address before the Conference on World Peace through the Role of Law of the Lawyers of Asia, in Japan, September 18, 1961.*

"... The impression sometimes given abroad (not least in the United States) that 'Iraq was going Communist' was never true. Popular, as distinct from governmental, feeling has, in and since 1960, become more definitely anti-Communist and anti-Russian than General Kassim himself."

Iraq under Kassim

By BRIGADIER STEPHEN HEMSLEY LONGRIGG
Royal Institute for International Affairs

THE IRAQ of early July, 1958, was a country not without its political discontents, its domestic and foreign critics, its anxieties; but it appeared to be solvent, materially progressive, prosperous—by Middle Eastern standards—secure, and—by those standards again—law-abiding.

The monarchy, with its Hashimite dynasty now represented by a young, hopeful and popular King, seemed universally acceptable after nearly 40 years of reign. A sufficiency of tried, senior servants of the Iraq State had been the pioneers of national independence and (with the British) builders of its administration, and these were still active in their functions, with younger successors already eminent. The Army was reckoned efficient and loyal. The state finances, aided by 30 per cent of oil royalties added to the ordinary budget and 70 per cent reserved for capital developments, were healthy. The oil industry itself, working under terms

of agreement more than ever favourable to Iraq, was constantly progressing in output—and in payable royalties. The work of the Development Board appeared well-conceived and controlled, and major works were in hand or completed. In industry and in modern-type agriculture much promising private enterprise was visible. The tribes were quiet, roads secure, schools multiplying, Baghdad University established; town-planning active. The Civil Service, overhauled by successive commissions, was as honest and efficient as any other to be found in Western Asia.

That representative democratic government was more apparent than real, parliamentary elections more formal or (often half-admittedly) "arranged" than freely conducted, the dominance of Nuri Sa'id excessive, cabinets fragile and short-lived, political liberty largely suppressed, was equally true. The Iraq of mid-July, 1958, was not, indeed, the "police state" alleged by hostile critics; but, in spite of reasonably generous freedom of movement, speech and enterprise, it had unquestionably less than its due of party-political liberty. The government of the Pasha (Nuri Sa'id) was anti-Communist and inimical to the restless maneuvers and pretensions of most of the politically-minded intelligentsia. There was, in consequence, suppression of much left wing or egalitarian party activity—in the interest, said the Government, of public tranquility and an undisturbed progress in development and living standards. Nuri Pasha himself was heard to promise full political liberty later on, if only he were granted ten years for the material build-up of the nation. His personal interest in social reform, land tenure

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improvement, or the uplift of the depressed classes was in fact not conspicuous.

Internationally, the Iraq of King Faisal II was not unaware of the desirability of the very best foreign relations; and being controlled by men of modern education and wide experience of world affairs, it had the appearance of a well-mannered member of international society. Iraq appeared well able, nevertheless, to assess and to guard against foreign dangers to the country. High among these the school of Nuri Pasha placed the U.S.S.R., and took its steps accordingly; such were the suppression of Communists and their views at home, the avoidance of all diplomatic relations with Moscow and the satellite countries, a specifically pro-Western attitude in global affairs (which had survived even the Western-led Suez fiasco of 1956) and adhesion to (if not the creation of) the Baghdad Pact of the "Northern tier" countries—Turkey, Iraq, Persia (Iran), Pakistan and Great Britain.

Relations with the last-named were generally cordial though not cloudless. Relations with France were poor by reason of the openly pro-Israeli attitude of the Quai d'Orsay. Relations with the United States, a permanent and benevolent "observer" of the Baghdad Pact meetings, and a generous lender or donor, were correct if unenthusiastic. The country, largely through its unpopular action in seeming to desert strict Arabism in favour of foreign and Western friends in the Baghdad Pact, had drifted somewhat apart from its Arab sister-states. Relations with Egypt were bad, both for this reason and because of clear personal animosity (based in part on jealousy) between Nuri and President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Iraq's failure to salute the triumph of Arab unity exemplified by the Syro-Egyptian foundation of the United Arab Republic in February, 1958, far from improved the tone between Tigris and Nile.

Though Iraqi-Syrian relations had until that date been fairly good, apart from Iraqi suspicion of apparent Communist influence at Damascus, the United Arab Republic redoubled its anti-Iraqi invective after the retaliatory establishment of the Arab Federation (of Iraq and Jordan) in May, 1958. With Kuwait, treated always correctly as an independent state and invited (unsuccess-

fully) to join the Arab Federation, Iraqi relations were normal, and a recent exchange of royal visits with Saudi Arabia helped relations to be more cordial than for some time past. Turkey had for years been a neighbour all the more friendly since Nuri Sa'id was a steady Turkophile, with close personal contacts there. Persian (Iranian) connections, not always untroubled in the past, were now satisfactory.

But immense changes were at hand. On July 14, 1958, a sudden military coup, led by an unknown Colonel, Abdul Karim Qasim (Kassim), destroyed the monarchy, established a military clique in the highest authority without meeting any opposition throughout the country, and to the murder of almost the entire royal family added that of Iraq's veteran and outstanding statesman, Nuri Sa'id.

A revolution was accomplished; the Iraqi Republic had come into existence. How would it fare?

Internal Problems after Revolution

We proceed next to survey the post-revolutionary period, after July, 1958, under three aspects: political and social affairs within Iraq, international relations, and economics.

Our picture must, in general, be an unattractive one. General Abdul Karim Kasim—the Sole Leader, as tasteless sycophancy was soon to style him—started his adventure in government with convinced patriotism, laborious devotion, personal honesty, conservative religion; but he turned out gravely to lack intellectual equipment, relevant experience, and the sense of balance for which, pre-eminently, his task called. He appeared little in public, but lived in Spartan military quarters surrounded by ill-chosen advisers and flattering officer-courtiers; and he seemed progressively to lose whatever powers of calm judgment he initially possessed. His attitude to his various potential supporters or opponents—Communists, Kurds, nationalists of varying creeds, or veteran statesmen—was clumsy and inconsistent, and by early 1962 he retained little positive support save that of an unknown proportion of the armed forces.

The latter, as under most military dictatorships, were expensively maintained, since without their support the Sole Leader could

not have lasted a week. Military expenditure took 40 per cent of the current budgets, and equipment for the forces was imported in very large quantities (on flattering terms) from the U.S.S.R., and on a small scale (until discontinued) from the United States. To what extent anti-Leader political views had gained entry into the Army and formed cells (perhaps of Ba'th party sympathizers) could not be known; but the extreme danger to the regime from such a development was obvious. Meanwhile, a pampered Army was the main bulwark of the governing clique.

In the revolutionary administration the most prominent and most regrettable feature was, for the first three years, the infamous People's Court, set up in its earliest days to try such enemies as former statesmen and high officials, senior officers, and prominent citizens suspected of loyalty to the Monarchy. With a tragic blend of sadism and buffoonery the court president (a cousin of the Leader, and himself a near-Communist colonel) found guilty some scores of accused upon various forms or degrees of evidence. Some (including valuable public servants of outstanding service and integrity) were put to death; more were condemned to death or long-term imprisonment, in some cases to be later pardoned or indulged with lesser sentences. This saddening spectacle, detestable to Iraq's best friends, could not but adversely affect the regime's reputation abroad, as did the curt and rancorous classification of almost all the pioneers and respected state-builders of the country's independence, dead or still living, as "traitors."

The removal from office, whether to prison or mere retirement, of many of the most efficient and specialized senior civil servants, on the sole ground that they had served the Governments of Nuri Sa'id, was a heavy blow to the dispatch of public affairs. The many delays and restrictions, wholesale "political" interference in administration, and the natural timidity of the frightened survivors among officialdom contributed to a marked slowing down and deterioration of the governmental machine. The Leader, it should be added, was not personally blood-thirsty, but appeared misled, ill-informed and bitter. The People's Court, which was used throughout 1959-1961 to try current

alleged crimes against the State, operated less offensively in 1961, and a number of veteran old-regime statesmen were released from prison.

Public order was fairly maintained, some months subsequent to the revolution, when the disorderly city mobs, student gangs, and groups of visiting tribesmen were less ubiquitous and menacing in the streets. At least five major episodes, however, between 1959 and 1961, contributed, or led, to major breaches of tranquillity. The insurgence of military units at Mosul under Colonel Shawwaf, in March, 1959—its origin apparently in Baathi intrigues based partly in Syria—was fiercely suppressed, with the Communists rallying eagerly to the Leader. Bloodshed and serious destruction of property were followed by reprisals and "trials" by the People's Court. In September of the same year, disorders in Kirkuk between Kurdish military units and Turcoman townsmen led to serious fighting, and were marked by exceptional brutality, for which the Communists were generally blamed. The attempted assassination of General Kassim himself in the streets, on October 19, was followed by his retirement to eight weeks in hospital, an increase in his own mystical sense of devotion and martyrdom, and the trial in the People's Court of some 70 suspects (20 in absence), upon whom a variety of severe sentences were passed. Early in 1961, rioting in Baghdad resulted from an anti-tax agitation, with political undertones not easily diagnosed but seemingly Communist. Later in the year the suppression of a widespread Kurdish rising was announced. Its extent—characteristically blamed by General Kassim on "British imperialists"—was evidently considerable. Its leadership was that of the incorrigible Barzani chief until recently (after his return from the U.S.S.R.) courted and favoured by the Sole Leader. Its suppression was notably truculent and, at the end of 1961, admittedly still incomplete. Communism and Kurdish nationalism were, throughout the period, inextricably mixed or even identified, and in either case hotly anti-Nasserite.

In addition to these major episodes, cases of violent crime, including politically-motivated murder, were reported fairly frequently from the outlying districts. Both in

these and in the main cities it was long after the revolution before the Leader, who felt full liberty of expression and assembly to be the country's outstanding need, would authorize disciplinary steps; thereafter, local Governors were given a wide and salutary discretion.

No Political Direction

The period, during much of which no political party activity was permitted, showed no sign of political direction. The first stage was that of a deep cleavage between those (would-be) politicians, including the Baath and most of the younger Nationalists, who demanded close relations with Nasser's Egypt, and those who refused this. The second stage, opening early in 1960, saw the registration of political parties again permitted, but upon a restricted scale which excluded the right-wing Nationalists, the Baath itself, and the main Communist body. Even those permitted to register—National Democrats, Kurdish Democrats, Islamic party, minority Communists, and later the National Progressives—could accomplish nothing. The main polarization of political life focussed on the attitude towards Nasser, and towards the U.S.S.R.; and behind all was the Leader's desire to attract whatever support he could by his smiles and favors, his promises of normalization of political life, his patriotic outbursts, his proclaimed devotion to Islam.

General Kassim was, and is, no Communist. It is true he hastened to establish relations with the U.S.S.R. and the satellites, welcomed their missions, loans and gifts, and was glad of (or indeed was for a time saved by) the aid of local Communists (Arab and Kurd alike) against Baathi and pan-Arab leanings to Egypt. He permitted or ignored, especially in 1958–1959, clear manifestations of Communist influence in the press and broadcasting, in high officialdom, in the professional and students' associations, and the para-military People's Militia.

But the impression sometimes given abroad (not least in the United States) that "Iraq was going Communist" was never true. Popular, as distinct from governmental, feeling has, in and since 1960, become more definitely anti-Communist and anti-Russian than General Kassim himself.

The latter is, indeed, obviously highly critical of the West; he listens to Marxist economic advisers, and refuses no Russian-derived material advantage. Even when hardest pressed, however, he has never considered giving any allegiance whatsoever to the Kremlin, nor has he allowed his local Communists to attain the position of privilege for which, in 1959, they were openly pressing. Outward signs of Communist influence were in late 1961 far less visible than in early post-revolutionary times.

International Relations

The earliest external phase of post-revolutionary Iraq looked not unhopeful. The country, though it had mortally offended Jordan, seemed likely to draw nearer to a welcoming United Arab Republic. Saudi Arabia had no occasion to be offended; it could view one more Hashimite eclipse with complacence. Turkey and Persia (Iran) could indeed expect Iraq's exit from the Baghdad Pact, a creation of Nuri Pasha, but without inevitable ill-feeling. In Europe and America the revolution, its violence deplored, was accepted and (politically) forgiven, especially when followed by no overt anti-Western moves; the new Government declared its intention of honouring its international obligations, paid tribute to its Western-run oil industry, and did not immediately renounce the Baghdad Pact. The British base at Habbaniya was, for some weeks, unmolested.

But during the years following, a muddled and ungracious policy, or impolicy, in its foreign affairs ran parallel to that of Iraq's Leader on his home front. In the Arab world, as 1962 opened, he retained no friends, even though Jordan had edged nearer, and Syria was a less uneasy neighbor since the break-up of the U.A.R. in October, 1961. Relations with Egypt varied between bad and explosive, with the free use of every exchangeable insult and provocation that jealousy and ill-will could prompt. With the Saudis, relations were little better—and deteriorated further after the shameless Iraqi claim in June, 1961, to annex, as "an integral part of Iraq," the wealthy, tiny amirate of Kuwait, whose origins, people, history, and reigning dynasty were in fact entirely non-Iraqi.

The Saudi government was the first to refute the claim and to send troops to defend Kuwait. Towards Arab unity in general the Iraqi attitude favored co-operation between equal, independent states, instead of the Nasserite ideal of integrated, or closely federal, unity. But the claim to Kuwait, rejected by every member of the Arab League, killed for the time the Iraqi case and influence, and Kuwait's acceptance into the League itself led in 1961 to Iraq's abstention from its meetings.

Relations with Turkey survived Iraq's retirement from the Baghdad Pact, and remained correct. With Persia (Iran) two needless quarrels developed during these years, one concerning the Shatt-el-Arab boundary, the other on loading rights at (Persian) Abadan. In each case a foolish and emotional attitude by Iraq led to bad, or even alarming, relations, fortunately of short duration.

Towards France, thanks to its Western alignment, Algerian policy and Zionist leanings, the Leader's attitude was consistently unfriendly; to West Germany and Italy it was comparatively benevolent. The United States—Western, pro-Israeli, and classed as neo-colonialist—could manage to avoid visible clashes with the Baghdad government, even after discontinuing its grants of material aid. Anglo-Iraqi relations, with Great Britain's long association with Iraq and the Leader's emotional anti-Westernism, were highly vulnerable, and in fact deteriorated. In spite of an occasional tolerant reference to the British, a Cultural Agreement, a limited arms-supply, occasional contracts for public works, and a remnant of social relations, the Iraqi attitude was too much influenced by its emotionally un-neutral neutralism, its receipt of benefits from the U.S.S.R., and its reaction against the allegedly British-favored "old regime," for enduring cordiality. The unsuccessful oil negotiations and the immediate British support for threatened Kuwait contributed to growing bitterness on the part of General Kassim.

With Russia and the satellite states, the outward picture was one of close relations, exchange of missions and visits (civil, military, industrial, educational), agreements and pacts, loans and gifts, and the supply of technicians, materials and armaments. The

U.S.S.R. indeed made visible efforts, along familiar lines, to gain effective entry to Iraq and dominate its councils. It failed. Russian-loaned personnel proved unpopular, and many were repatriated; Russian goods were often condemned as inferior; visitors to Moscow left dissatisfied. Iraq's benefits from much Russian material generosity and technical help were considerable, and Russian support against "the imperialists" was politically welcome. Yet the expected cordiality did not materialize, and the Leader's frequent harshness to local Communists increasingly displeased the Kremlin. Neither country can afford at present to quarrel with the other, and relations continue close at many levels; but any idea of sincere Iraqi affection for, or obedience to, its new found benefactor can be dismissed.

Economics

The revolutionary government, while busily discrediting the achievements and projects of its predecessor, has been itself an active planner, with a temporary I.D.400 million development plan announced early in 1960, and a still greater Permanent Economic Plan, involving I.D.600 million, late in 1961. The latter, the financing of which appears to be provided for only partly is intended to broaden and expedite all forms of development beyond limits previously foreseen, to increase Iraq's national income by nine per cent a year, and to double the per capita wealth by 1970. Meanwhile, current allotments of the oil revenues for development were reduced (presumably by reason of military exigencies) from 70 per cent to 50 per cent, the Development Board's administration deteriorated, and some of its best officials were removed. A policy of more immediately beneficial and visible works, to be carried out in some cases by the provincial administrations, especially in state-financed industry, was announced, and some long-range irrigation projects were abandoned.

Government's receipts from the Iraq Petroleum Company and its sister companies rose annually—to some I.D.100 million in 1961, apart from a powerful injection of money directly to the public—and formed as great a part as ever of the country's income available for current expenses and capital works. The routine tasks of state budgeting

and accounting appeared to be realistically handled. Taxation receipts were poor, notably from agriculture, customs duty, and income tax. The country's foreign exchange position deteriorated, and seemed likely to need firm measures to improve it. Much financial help, both immediate and long-term, was received under the Economic Pact of March, 1959, with Russia. The spending of the considerable resulting sums on railway, port and airport improvement, irrigation, refineries and factories, roads and buildings, is to continue under the Permanent Economic Plan. Some of the difficulties resulting from large-scale, sudden spending, however, began to appear in the country's economic picture.

Trade with the U.S.S.R. increased to a moderate extent, and also with the satellite countries, with most of which trade pacts, some effective, some nominal, were made. Contracts were allotted to east-European and East German concerns and their technicians appeared in numbers in Iraq. In spite of this the Western powers, and notably Great Britain, remained the country's main customers and suppliers, though by a decreasing margin. The political atmosphere, administrative inefficiency and delays, censorship and travel restrictions, and at times (notably 1958-1959) ceaseless political demonstrations and strikes, exercised a depressing effect on trade and local industry. Indeed, the contribution of the latter to national wealth (excepting, of course, the foreign-operated oil industry) remained and was likely to remain small.

The oil industry, through its identically-constituted international companies, operated with great success and productivity in spite of long-drawn and finally unsuccessful

negotiations concerned with ever-increasing and insatiable government demands and restrictions. In the fall of 1961 the Sole Leader, who disdained or ignored such expert advisers as had survived his political purges, announced a reduction of the companies' area to one-half of one per cent of their existing concession-granted area. Meanwhile, great works intended to increase output (and government revenue) had been accomplished by them in drilling and equipping fields, exploration (until this was arbitrarily stopped by government order), pipe lining, processing, and provision of a deep-water loading-base at the head of the Gulf. Iraq's annual crude oil production was, for the years 1957 to 1961 inclusive, 21.5, 35.5, 41.5, 47 and 48 million tons. A figure of 70 million is now the not distant objective, but the present governmental attitude is far from encouraging, and may well destroy such hopes.

Iraq's staple industry, agriculture, passed through a bad period. Highly adverse conditions in 1959 and 1960 ruined all grain crops and led to the import of grain in place of the usual considerable export. The break-up of large, privately-owned estates into small peasant-holdings—a desideratum of the revolutionary government—made some progress, but the disappearance of the landlord's services in irrigation, financing and so on proved a serious, though perhaps temporary, blow to cultivation in the areas concerned. Agricultural development was scheduled to receive some 20 per cent of funds under the Permanent Development Plan, including 52 "major projects" of irrigation, drainage, storage and crop-improvement.

"For as long a time as we can see into the future, we shall be living between war and peace, between a war that cannot be fought and a peace that cannot be achieved. The great issues which divide the world cannot be decided by a war that could be won, and they cannot be settled by a treaty that can be negotiated. There . . . is the root of the frustration which our people feel. Our world is divided as it has not been since the religious wars of the 17th century and a large part of the globe is in a great upheaval, the like of which has not been known since the end of the Middle Ages. But the power which used to deal with the divisions and conflicts of the past, namely, organized war, has become an impossible instrument to use."—Walter Lippmann, author and columnist, in an address before the Women's National Press Club, Washington, D.C., January 10, 1962.

Discussing Turkey's new government under President Cemal Gursel, this specialist points out that "the probable result of all . . . [the] innovations would seem to be a better chance for the successful development of the procedures of parliamentary government." Furthermore, "a good omen would seem to exist in the fact that Ismet Inonu is Prime Minister at this critical time."

Post-Revolutionary Politics in Turkey

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THE THREE YEARS that have elapsed since the last article on Turkey appeared in these columns¹ have been marked by events that may well constitute an outstanding landmark in Turkey's political development. These events have occurred mainly in her internal affairs. In the field of external relations Turkey has maintained the stable and steady policy of alignment with the non-Communist world that, with a minimum of deviation, has characterized the era of the Turkish Republic. It would, it is believed, be difficult to discover in the annals of any Western country a series of more consistently enlightened and resolute statements and courses of action with regard to the U.S.S.R., its aims and its policies, than are to be found in the pronouncements and positions of Turkey's Foreign Office during this period.

Ellen D. Ellis first visited Turkey 48 years ago, and is well known to our readers for her studies of the Middle East. Formerly head of the History Department at Constantinople College, she also served as acting librarian at Istanbul Women's College in 1946-1947. Long a member of the Department of History, and the first chairman of the Department of Political Science at Mount Holyoke College, she has also served as Professor of Political Science at the Holyoke Junior College.

Comparable steadiness and stability have not marked Turkey's internal political life since 1959, although history may show that here, too, what has been taking place has been evolution rather than revolution. Appraisals made in 1959 of the economic and political situation in Turkey held in general that conditions were moving in the right direction. In July of that year the Deputy Secretary-General of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation declared Turkey's stabilization program to have been a "success," and that her economy has been "maintained on an even keel." "In writing Turkey's economic history," he is reported to have asserted, "I am certain the year 1959 will be highlighted as marking the beginning of a new forward thrust." "One more effort now," he stated, "and you will be over the difficult part." In the political field, also, in the first half of 1959 circumstances seemed to many to point towards a progressive development of a parliamentary system motivated by two major parties, the People's Republican party and the Democratic party, supplemented by a number of minor parties.

Even at that time, however, rumblings could be heard in the economic as well as in the political sphere. Despite the above auspicious interpretations of the Turkish economy, serious weaknesses existed which were to become increasingly evident. Turkey's trade balance remained unfavorable, her foreign debt was enormous, and inflation

¹ E. D. Ellis, "Turkish Nationalism in the Post War World," *Current History*, February, 1959, pp. 86-91.

persisted due to inability to meet the consumption demands of the Turkish people. In the latter part of 1959, of 51 state enterprises conducted by the Menderes regime, 19 were operating at a loss partly because of bad judgment and misjudgment.

Political Weaknesses

The political system of Turkey, too, was marked by elements of weakness comparable to those perceptible in her economic structure. Of these, the two main and closely related trouble spots were the problems of freedom of speech and the press and the role of the Opposition in government.

From the early days of the Republic, Turkish leaders, beginning with Ataturk, looked forward to a two- or a multi-party system for Turkey. The reasons motivating them were various, and varied somewhat according to the political situation of the moment. The example of Western parliamentary systems was an important factor; Ataturk saw, also, in inter-party debate and discussion of public questions a means of political education. For a variety of reasons, however, early attempts at the formation of second parties were not successful, and the government of the Turkish Republic was virtually a one-party government until 1946 when the Democratic party was established by discontented former members of the original Republican party.

The first multi-party election was that for the Grand National Assembly in July, 1946, in which the Republican party and the Democratic party were the main protagonists; minor parties played a conspicuously lesser role. In that election the Republican party secured the majority of seats in the Assembly, although the Democrats claimed the greater popular support. With this election the Turkish Republic was faced with an entirely new institution, a political Opposition, an institution that had developed originally in Great Britain only through centuries of practical experience, and *pari passu*, it should be noted, with the gradual evolution there of the civil liberties, notably freedom of speech and the press, of assembly and organization, that have become practically synonymous with Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.

The problem of freedom of speech has been one of the thorniest problems for the peoples experimenting with democratic insti-

tutions during the past 300 years; and with regard to it opinion in those countries, especially under the impact of revolutionary communism, is still sharply divided. The purpose of freedom of speech may be said to be twofold: the discovery of truth and the development of man's rational faculties through exchange of ideas with fellowmen. If these be the justifiable purposes of free speech, we may ask, is the restriction of speech for other purposes justifiable? What (in this connection, for example) of libel and slander laws imposed and accepted by society because the libelous or slanderous word itself becomes in effect harmful to another person or to his reputation? And what of words inciting to violent action against government? Are such words, if sufficiently inflammatory, to be identified or equated with acts as they have been in the United States according to the principle of "clear and present" or even "probable" danger to the government when emanating from the Communist apparatus? Are words uttered in criticism of an existing regime or its incumbents to be banned as positively harmful or dangerous to the regime or to the individual against which or against whom they are directed, by analogy with the case of libel and slander?

The legal systems of the "Western democracies" have had to meet and attempt to answer these questions. In doing so they have had to draw very fine lines and distinctions in order to protect at one and the same time the individual and his freedoms, the state and the democratic institutions and procedures of government. Especially in the matter of free elections it has been necessary to distinguish between words harmful to an individual personally and to his reputation, as in libel and slander, and words critical of governmental policies and measures, uttered with the intent of bringing about the downfall of a government as in an election campaign. And the same distinction has had to be maintained between words intended to harm an individual in his private capacity and words critical of him as an office holder.

It is obvious that unless these distinctions are delineated and understood, discussion of political questions is rendered virtually impossible and the democratic process whereby the minority may at all times attempt to

transform itself into the majority and take over the reins of government, is completely ruled out. Under such circumstances resort to illegal methods which expose those unsympathetic with an existing regime to coercive sanctions, or resort even to revolution, may become the only possible channel of political change.

This is especially true where adequate "bills of rights" are not introduced into constitutions, and/or when constitutions do not provide adequately for judicial review of government action to test its constitutionality. In such cases, the individual wishing to express his political opinion in the form of speech, writing, or assembly or participation in election campaigns, may have no basis for appeal to the courts on constitutional grounds for remedy against interference with such activities.

In Chapter V of the Turkish constitution of 1924 were stated the *General Rights of Turkish Citizens* (publication of 1945). Here we read in Article 68: "The limits of an individual's liberty, which is his natural right, extend only to the point where they infringe on the liberties enjoyed by his fellow-citizens. The said limits are refined *solely by law* (the italics are mine)." In Article 70 it is stated: "Personal immunity, freedom . . . of speech and press, the right to travel . . . to meet and associate . . . form part of the rights and liberties of Turkish citizens." The questions arising here are: "How far may the law legitimately go in defining and delimiting these liberties?" And "is any judicial review of legislative or administrative action provided to keep these delimitations within the principles of the constitution?" Article 72 provides that "no individual shall be arrested and detained under any circumstances or in any manner other than *provided by law* (the italics are mine)." Here again the questions propounded above obtain, as they do in relation to Article 77 which reads: "The press shall enjoy freedom *within the framework of the law* (the italics are mine), and shall not be subject to any censorship or control prior to publication."

The implication of these provisions would seem to be that the legislature was in large measure free to impose limitations and restrictions on individuals. There was, moreover, no suggestion of judicial review of legis-

lation in the Turkish constitution of 1924, although Article 61 provided for a High Court with power to try members of the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet), the President and members of the Council of State and of the Court of Cassation as well as the Chief Prosecutor in all matters arising from the performance of their duties." It is significant, however, that the High Court was, according to Article 67, to be "constituted by decision of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey whenever it is deemed necessary," which may in part explain why it was not brought into action to deal with the irregularities of the Menderes regime, the Assembly being, for reasons to appear later, under the control of the Prime Minister. It is clear that the net results of these constitutional provisions (and omissions) was to hamstring the functioning of a multi-party system, including the vital organ of such a system, an Opposition, even though the facade of a multi-party system existed in Turkey after 1946.

Balance of Power

But the anomalies present in Turkey's attempt to develop parliamentary, multi-party government under the constitution of 1924 were more far-reaching still. Such a government, to be viable, depends upon a certain balance of power between the legislative and executive branches, a balance which in Turkey did not exist. Article 5 of the constitution of 1924 declares: "Legislative authority and executive powers are concentrated and manifested in the Grand National Assembly (a unicameral body)." Thus the principle of the separation of power is renounced at the outset. And although the constitution provides (Article 22) that "questions, interpellations, and parliamentary inquiries (shall) lie within the province of the Assembly," and although (Article 46) "the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible for the general policy of the Government," and "each minister shall be individually responsible for the affairs falling within his jurisdiction and for the acts and deeds of his subordinates as well as for his general policy," there is on the one hand no specific provision whereby the Assembly could force a resignation of a minister or the ministry, nor, on the other hand, whereby the Presi-

dent of the Republic or any other official could order a dissolution of the Assembly and a new election, and thereby potentially a change of ministry.

In relation to the members of the Ministry themselves, moreover, the apparatus of true parliamentary government as known to the Western world did not exist under the earlier constitution of Republican Turkey. Where (as in the United States) judicial review of the political action of government exists to test its constitutionality, if an executive or administrative official acts beyond or contrary to the constitution or to the law conferring power upon him, the law provides a remedy for the individual who has suffered loss, commensurate with the degree of loss incurred. In such a case, the main objective is the protection or the indemnification of the individual rather than punishment of the official. In the case of more flagrant violation of the constitution or the law, usually the criminal law, the immediate procedure of "impeachment" is provided, for which in the United States constitution the penalty of removal from office and ineligibility for future holding of office is prescribed, the person thus removed from office being then liable under civil or criminal law for what he may have done. The constitution of 1924 provided for a procedure akin to impeachment only in the case of a charge of "high treason" (not defined), brought against the President of Turkey, who was made responsible to the Grand National Assembly under those circumstances.

According to the penal code in effect under the constitution of 1924 a violation of the constitution was equated with the crime of treason itself in that both of these offenses were made subject to the death penalty. This provision, it is to be noted, in a sense identified the Turkish state with the constitution, a creature of the state, and made the performance of the executive and administrative function as well as the legislative function a critically perilous undertaking—a situation not calculated to ensure smooth or effective governmental operation.

The 1960 Revolution

Limitation of space precludes a detailed account of the specific circumstances and events leading to the Revolution of 1960.

A few only may be presented here. The Democratic party, which came into power in 1950 had arisen in protest against the stringencies of the Republican regime. Yet, strangely or otherwise, the difficulties under which the Democrats had labored as the Opposition party were under the Democratic regime to reappear in an intensified form for the Republican Opposition. Most of these difficulties can be traced to the facts with which we have been concerned above. Although the momentous step of departing from a one-party government had been outwardly taken, that step had not been underscored by a sufficient comprehension of the implications of freedom of speech and the press and organization and assembly, nor by providing the apparatus essential to the functioning of an Opposition in an effective parliamentary government.

As early as 1954 a wide-ranging press law was enacted prescribing severe penalties for an "insult to the honor" or an "invasion of the privacy" of public officials, or publishing anything that could bring "harm to the political honor or national reputation of the state or . . . create alarm or anxiety in public opinion." This law was rigidly applied, and although there was no pre-publication censorship, throughout the Democratic era suppression of publications and imprisonment of editors and the imposition of heavy fines followed one another with great regularity. After 1957 government restrictions were still more assiduously enforced, invading the field of academic freedom and that of the political activities of university professors. In 1959 the venerable Ahmed Emin Yalman, editor of the Republican newspaper *Vatan*, was sentenced to a prison term for printing an article "critical" of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.

The Menderes government, also, became increasingly restrictive of political parties and their activities, and in such a manner and to such a degree as to destroy all opposition, even on the part of the other major party, the Republican party. In April, 1960, an exclusively Democratic investigating committee was set up to inquire into the "destructive and illegal activities of the Opposition Republican party" and was given power to suspend all party activity for three months, which it promptly did. Shortly thereafter

Ismet Inönü, leader of the Republican party, was excluded from 12 sessions of the Grand National Assembly, charged with advocating resistance to the Democratic regime and "thereby" threatening the security of the state," and was removed by force from the Assembly chamber.

The Turkish government thereby became in effect a one-party government under a dictatorship. In the words of the provisional constitution promulgated by the military group that afterwards assumed power:

The Turkish Grand National Assembly had forfeited its legitimacy through being reduced in effect to the status of a political party group by the administrators of the ruling party who had trampled the Constitution underfoot, abrogated all personal and human rights and freedoms and immunities of the Turkish nation, and established a single-party dictatorship by rendering the Opposition's supervisory functions inoperative.

Government interference with the universities, as well as with the press and with political activity, drew students into the worsening situation. In April of 1960 in Istanbul and Ankara, student demonstrations in the name of freedom were fired upon by the police and some students were reported to have been killed and mutilated. In Ankara, Young Cadets from the Turkish War College joined in the demonstrations and on May 22, 1960, the Government ordered all colleges and universities closed. On May 27, 1960, Turkey's "First Republic" came to an end. The army, led by General Cemal Gursel, dissolved the Grand National Assembly and handed over the administration to the military group referred to above, to be known as the "Committee of National Unity" which promised to bring about an "honest and just democratic order" to which authority would be handed over, once such an order should have been established.

Editors and students imprisoned under the former regime were forthwith set at liberty and a committee composed of university professors and jurists was appointed to prepare a new constitution for the Turkish Republic. In the meantime, political parties were to cease all activity and public affairs were to be conducted by a provisional government in which the Committee of National Unity was to exercise the highest authority.

² News From Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 33, October 17, 1960.

The two main objectives of the provisional government were to "bring to heel" the leaders of the former Democratic regime and to provide Turkey with a permanent constitution. These two procedures went on simultaneously. The new administration immediately placed under arrest former President Celal Bayar, former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, other members of the Menderes Cabinet and other high officials of the Democratic government, as well as almost all the Democratic members of the Grand National Assembly. In preparation for trials to come later an Inquiry was entrusted to a committee composed of three cabinet ministers of the provisional government, four professors, three military judges and a Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals. The Inquiry began its work on June 4, 1960.

The trials, conducted by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, provided for in the provisional constitution, were begun on October 14, 1960. The main charges preferred against the Democratic leaders were anti-constitutional legislation, violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution and the Democratic platform and program, including the "abrogation of fundamental principles of the rule of law, human dignity and self respect, free elections, impartial administration, freedom of the courts, guaranteed rights of civil service personnel, performance of public service and functions without bribery and corruption."² In July, 1960, former President Bayar had been indicted for high treason by the Committee of National Unity and was duly brought to trial for this by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice.

The trials lasted for about ten months during which nearly 700 defendants and more than 1000 witnesses were heard in 202 sessions. In the end 15 death sentences, including those of deposed President Bayar and deposed Prime Minister Menderes, were decreed. The terms of imprisonment imposed varied from one year to life imprisonment; there were more than 100 acquittals. The Committee of National Unity commuted 12 of the sentences of death to life imprisonment, including that of former President Bayar, the death sentence being thus reserved for former Finance Minister Polatkan, former Foreign Minister Zorlu and former

Prime Minister Menderes whose chief offenses, among many, had been the responsibility for the use of force against student demonstrators, treason, and violation of the constitution.

The "Constitution of the Turkish Republic," as the permanent constitution for the post-revolutionary regime was designated, was duly drawn up by the board of university professors and jurists. In October, 1960, it was handed on to a newly elected Constituent Assembly. After its approval by this body it was submitted to a popular referendum held on July 9, 1961, and received acceptance by a two-thirds majority; 83 per cent of the eligible voters voted, and 62 per cent of those voting gave it their approval. The constitution became operative on October 25, 1961, as a result of elections to the legislature held on October 20, 1961. On October 26, 1961, General Gursel was elected President by a joint session of the Senate of the Republic and the National Assembly and thereupon resigned from the army, thus redeeming the pledge that the government would be returned to civilian control, and giving the revolution the "uniqueness" that it claimed in this respect.

Since no party received an absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly, a coalition government was necessary—another innovation to be mastered. Ismet İnönü was finally appointed Prime Minister, and after some difficulty he secured the co-operation of the Justice party, the second major party. A coalition cabinet based on the Republican party and the Justice party was announced on November 20, 1961. The other two major parties, the New Turkey party and the Republican Nation party, remained outside the government in opposition, the Democratic party no longer existing as such.

Terms of the New Constitution

The new constitution marks a great advance over the constitution of 1924, profiting from the experience of the intervening years. The main differences between the two documents have been introduced, it would seem evident, to provide the necessary "infrastructure" for a more workable balance between executive and legislative in a parliamentary system, on the one hand, and on the other,

for a viable role for a genuine Opposition in a multi two-major-party government of the parliamentary type. Only the most striking innovations can receive attention here. It is believed that their significance will be perceptible in the light of the foregoing discussion.

To begin, the Turkish Republic is declared to be "nationalistic, democratic, secular and social," supplanting the statement in the earlier constitution that the "Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular, and reformist." Separation of power as between the executive and the legislature, the Grand National Assembly, is recognized as it was not in the 1924 constitution. This makes possible certain checks and balances between these two branches (essential, as has been shown, for the operation of true parliamentary government). For example, while both constitutions provide that decrees promulgated by the President must be countersigned by the minister or ministers concerned, who thereby become responsible for the decrees they have countersigned, and while both constitutions provide for "questions, interpellations and parliamentary inquiries" directed to the executive by members of the legislature, the earlier constitution leaves many questions unanswered as to the effects of these provisions, answers to which are suggested in the later constitution. There it is evident that the ministry may be unseated by a vote of no confidence "during the debate of an interpellation or the request for a vote of confidence" (Articles 89 and 108). If the Council of Ministers has been unseated twice within the period of 18 months for either of the above causes, moreover, "the Prime Minister may request the President of the Republic to call new elections for the National Assembly," whereupon, after consulting the Chairmen of the legislative bodies, he *may* (n.b.), decide to call new elections. The calling of new elections is hedged about with many provisions to ensure their regularity and fairness.

The provision for the impeachment (now so designated) of the President by the Grand National Assembly—the two legislative houses—for high treason, which is still undefined, is somewhat more explicit in the new constitution than in the old. The fact that the 1961 constitution provides for a

bicameral legislature, a National Assembly and a Senate, creates an internal limitation on the action of the legislative branch not present in the earlier document. Legislative immunities are more fully elaborated in the 1961 constitution. The probable result of all these innovations would seem to be a better chance for the successful development of the procedures of parliamentary government.

This likelihood would seem to be enhanced by the fact that the further check of judicial review of legislation was specifically written into the 1961 constitution, and by the more careful spelling out of individual rights in the constitution of that year. The "fundamental rights"—freedom of thought and belief, freedom of the press, of publication, of association, and many others are listed. While many of these rights are still left to be defined by legislative action, that action is hedged about by many limitations and qualifications in the interest of individual freedom. These limitations reflect clearly the incidents and the difficulties under which individuals labored in the interval between 1924 and 1961.

Turkish universities are to be protected from governmental interference by the provision that their "organs, their teachers and their assistants may not for any reason whatsoever be removed from their office by authorities other than the universities," and that "members of the teaching staffs of universities and their assistants may freely engage in research and publication activities." They may join political parties but "may not assume executive functions outside the central organization of political parties." One interesting and pertinent provision of the 1961 constitution provides that political parties, "whether in power or in opposition," are "indispensable entities of democratic political life," and that they can be "founded without prior permission and shall operate freely."

The period since November, 1961, is too short to allow of any valid judgment concerning the probable future course of political or other events and developments in Turkey under the new regime. The program of the coalition government presented to the Grand National Assembly pledged "new investments without resorting to inflationary practices, land reforms, and tax reforms, im-

provement of state enterprises and increasing exports." The pro-Western foreign policy was to be continued, with friendly relations, so far as possible, with all countries. A continuation of the efforts of the provisional government to extend education was promised; agricultural development was to be a major objective; labor legislation was to be liberalized.

Whether the innovations of the 1961 constitution, taken together with the ability and the good will of the Turkish leaders and people properly to manipulate them, are sufficient to provide Turkey with an effective apparatus for parliamentary multi-party government remains to be proved in the doing. A good omen would seem to exist in the fact that Ismet Inönü is Prime Minister at this critical time. Since 1950 he has shown himself, through his pronouncements and his acts, more perceptive of the requirements of and for party government, and especially of and for the role of the Opposition in a multi-party parliamentary system than, perhaps, any other Turkish leader.

The Cyprus Problem

When the writer's previous article went to press the four-sided issue of Cyprus, over which Turkey and Greece were at odds and to which the United Kingdom was an interested party, was still unresolved. The formal resolution came in the London agreements of February, 1959. By these agreements Cyprus was to be an "independent" republic with a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president, each elected by his own community to serve for five years, and each with veto power over legislative acts except those with regard to participation by Cyprus in international organizations or alliances of which Turkey and Greece should be members. There was to be a Council of Ministers consisting of seven Greeks and three Turks appointed by the president and vice-president respectively. A unicameral legislature was agreed upon, 70 per cent Greek and 30 per cent Turkish; Greek and Turkish were both to be official languages. Two Communal Chambers, representing Greek and Turkish residents respectively, were to have charge of matters pertaining to religion, education, culture and personal status. In the five largest towns the Turks would have separate municipi-

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Discussing the precarious balance maintained by Iran's government, this author points out that the "array of opposition to Amini would indicate not so much his imminent fall as that he would have fallen months ago if it were not that his opponents are so thoroughly divided and fragmented within and among themselves. However much the opposition groups dislike Amini, they dislike and distrust more all the possible alternatives to Amini."

Reform Government in Iran

BY ANDREW F. WESTWOOD

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ONCE AGAIN Iran is in the midst of a major crisis. As this was written, the crisis had yet to come to a head, but the threat to the regime seemed even more serious than that of the Mossadegh era a decade ago. Yet predictions on the future of the regime in Iran are particularly rash, for as one looks back over the years the durability of the regime amidst continuing crises is remarkable. At the end of the Second World War, there were very strong indications that the first major internal upheaval in the Middle East would come in Iran. Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Turkey have seen fundamental changes while the regime in Iran remains, as precarious in the midst of crisis as it was in 1946-1947.

Events in Iran can hardly be understood without cognizance of this durability of both regime and crisis. There are many explanations for it: the particular character of the Persian as a political animal, the extent of American aid and involvement in the past decade, or the lack of organizing talent in

the opposition. All have partial merit, but the approach that sheds the most light begins with a marked feature and root cause of the present crisis: the exceptional fragmentation, indeed atomization, of the political society in Iran.

The shape of the present crisis is that Premier Ali Amini, who came to power on May 5, 1961, has succeeded in providing Iran with the most effective reform government in over a decade, all of which has won him mounting opposition not only from the wealthy conservatives directly affected by his reforms but from almost every other element active in politics as well. The radical Left, demanding reform, is in particularly strident opposition. Amini can count on active support only from a small group of liberal, younger and often American-educated economic technicians, many of whom he has brought into high position in the Cabinet. In every other direction he finds latent or active opposition.

The Shah appointed Amini to office, but is not for that reason to be counted as an assured source of support. For the Shah and Amini have been at odds for some years and in the 1960 elections Amini played a most prominent role in the defeat of the Shah's plans, an event which precipitated the present crisis. The Shah appointed Amini, in much the fashion he called on Mossadegh in 1951, when the situation was rapidly slipping out of control and only Amini offered much promise of restoring control. The Shah supports Amini because he needs him, but the moment he does not, Amini may find an opponent in the Shah.

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Opposition to Amini

The Army, dominated by the Shah insofar as it is dominated by anyone, has long been deeply involved in politics which divide rather than unite it. Many of the older and senior officers, by the measure of their wealth in land and commerce and their access to political power, belong with the largest landlords and merchants in the small "élite." As a group, these senior officers suffered first and most severely under Amini, who arrested a few of the most prominent for corruption and forced a group of over 300 into retirement. The younger and largely junior officers, on the other hand, reflect the discontents of the middle class from which they were drawn and tend to sympathize with the radical Left. In all probability, these junior officers shared the delight of the middle class with Amini's action against the senior officers and share equally the middle class disinclination to lend support to Amini.

The National Front, a resurrection of Mossadegh's organization by some who were closely associated with him and some who were not, has evoked, to all appearances, an avid response from the urban middle class. It opposes Amini not because of his reforms, which are called fraudulent, but for the formal reason that he secured the dismissal of the Majlis and then, refusing to hold new elections, governs by decree. That Amini's government is unconstitutional and undemocratic is technically correct but incidentally is also applicable to the government of the hero of the Front, Mossadegh. The argument covers the real objective: Amini blocks the aspiration of the leaders of the Front. Amini's ban on mass demonstrations, the prime technique by which the Front can hope to gain power, and his refusal to hold elections, through which the Front might gain a minority position in the Majlis and a platform with parliamentary immunity from which to agitate, have been major frustrations for the Front.

Finally, much of the "élite," to which Amini, one of the largest and most wealthy landlords, belongs, is opposed to his government. Not only has his government moved against corruption but for the first time in modern Iran a few of the "big fish" have

been convicted and jailed. This failure to make the usual political distinctions in such matters threatens almost everyone of wealth and power, for few have clean hands. Amini's refusal to hold elections to reconstitute the Majlis is equally serious for the "élite," who have demonstrated in the past the ability to control the majority made up of rural seats. The Majlis has provided the "élite" with a vital base of power somewhat independent of the Shah and the Cabinet from which members of the "élite" could obstruct and influence the actions of the government. Without this independent base of power, the members of the "élite" are forced back upon their much less reliable ability to influence the Shah, the Ministers and the lower levels of the bureaucracy. They are by no means impotent without a seat in the Majlis but their political power is distinctly lessened.

The peasants and urban poor, parenthetically, play almost no independent political role as yet in Iran. They may do so in the future, but up to the present they have been instruments of others, raw material for urban mobs or demonstrations against almost anything or, in the villages, a most conservative force opposed to all outsiders and subject to political manipulation by their landlords and local officials.

This array of opposition to Amini would indicate not so much his imminent fall as that he would have fallen months ago if it were not that his opponents are so thoroughly divided and fragmented within and among themselves. However much the opposition groups dislike Amini, they dislike and distrust more all the possible alternatives to Amini. And no opposition group has the organization with trust and discipline to give it confidence to move upon a seizure of power, carrying the risk of reaction from a combination of their greater enemies. Amini is denounced and simultaneously tolerated because all fear the possible alternatives if Amini falls.

The National Front

The National Front presses the most openly and perhaps the hardest of the opposition factions, but it is what the name implies, a loose coalition of four political "parties" and a number of other factions.¹

¹ The four parties are the Iran Party, the Third Force, the People of Iran Party and the Pan-Iran Party.

It is, if possible, even less a united organization than its predecessor of a decade ago, which was given what structure and direction it had by Mossadegh's outstanding qualities. Some of the multiple spokesmen of the present National Front, such as Karim Sanjabi and Allahyar Saleh, are known and respected men. But no one spokesman, and certainly not all collectively, can approach the almost charismatic popularity and public confidence enjoyed by Mossadegh. The parties constituting the Front themselves are diffuse bodies of uncertain membership and little discipline, while these qualities are compounded in the Front. In a sense, the Front is a froth thrown up by a strong surge of public emotion in search of a leader rather than the source of public leadership and direction.

This character of the National Front is not only a source of weakness within but a source of danger to the regime as well. For if its varied leaders riding upon the surge of emotion can turn the whirlwind into the streets to endanger any government, they cannot offer a defined alternative. No one knows who would exercise power and for what purposes if the Front came to office. Allahyar Saleh, a moderate from a prominent, wealthy, family, heads the largest single faction, but it is doubtful that he can significantly sway the course of the Front while in opposition, to say nothing of the responsibilities of power. It is even doubtful that the Iran party members will follow Saleh with any constancy.

Furthermore, it is at this point that the Tudeh or Communist party enters the scene. The spokesmen of the Front are emphatically, and to all evidence sincerely, non-Communist, but this has not led the Tudeh to abandon its only promising tactic of self-affiliation with and infiltration into the Front. The Tudeh seems no serious threat in and of itself, while the very diffuse character of the Front favors infiltration and exaggerates the leverage which any disciplined group, however small, can exert within. The Tudeh was highly successful with such tactics in the latter months of Mossadegh's reign and the potentialities for the future are not to be discounted.

² One prominent example is Gen. Bakhtiar, former chief of the secret police, SAVEK, who actively sought his own rise to power until the Shah forced him into exile at the end of January, 1962.

The Role of the Army

The Shah opposes the Front for these and other reasons derived from his personal experience with Mossadegh, but he lacks an alternative other than Amini. A reign of police and military repression was tried from 1953 on, only to have it provide much of the cutting edge of the present crisis. In time, by 1957 or even earlier, such repression coupled with corruption and stagnation generated more and more serious opposition than it put down. In every present move toward a return to this reign there is a sharp danger of a major explosion in the streets against which the Army may not prove reliable. The Army and the police can handle such an event if they will, but the junior officers might well refuse or turn against the Shah rather than shoot their friends and literally brothers in the radical Left.

The senior officers probably would support the Shah in such a situation with a will, but they cannot trust the junior officers and hence their own control over the Army any more than he. In addition, the senior officers cannot entirely rely upon the Shah against the junior officers, nor can they rely upon the junior officers against the Shah. They are deeply involved in the political struggle² and not above plotting to replace the Shah, whose father came to the throne from the Army, but on vital internal issues they cannot rely upon their own control of the Army, on the Shah, on the public speaking through the voice of the National Front or even fully rely upon each other.

A coup from the relatively junior ranks, on the model of Nasser of Egypt or Kassim of Iraq, is never to be discounted although beyond prediction. But such a step would have to be taken not only against the Shah, Amini, the senior officers and the "élite," but against the popular civilian leadership of the National Front as well. If the National Front is not clear whom it wants to come to power, it is clearly against a return to military rule from whatever source.

The Army is divided within and from the Shah, who must rely upon and seek to control it by never relying too much on any one individual or faction. In turn, the Army is divided from the older and more potent members of the civilian "élite," who

suffered heavily under the military dictatorship of the Shah's father and seek no return to military rule over their own interests in any form. This division has provided the Shah with a vital lever in the past, for he has been able to play civilian politicians off against Army politicians to the vast improvement of his control over both. From 1954 until about 1958, the Shah's apparently firm grasp on power was based in considerable part on such a situation. Its collapse played a central role in precipitating the present crisis.

The Elite and the Status Quo

The Shah's alignment with the members of the "élite" was based not on trust or even so much on identity of interests as upon his recognition and concession of their position of independent power in the Majlis. This had been worked out in the 1954 elections immediately following Mossadegh and perfected in the 1956 elections through the device of government support for "élite" candidates. Its basic condition, probably never openly spoken, was that the Shah's government would not seriously injure the interests of the "élite," whatever public statements it felt required to make, and the "élite" would hold an independent power of obstruction in the Majlis to ensure this condition. It was a coalition to maintain the status quo in a static fashion.

Beginning in 1957, and with urgency after the Kassim coup in neighboring Iraq during July, 1958, the Shah disrupted this coalition by pressing gradual and modest reforms as the alternative to revolution. Much of the "élite" resisted, while increasing their search for immediate monetary gains against the ever more uncertain future. Still from their position in the Majlis, the "élite" could delay and block legislation, then emasculate it, and then prevent the enforcement of the emasculated version by the bureaucracy, as was the case with land reform legislation in 1958-1959. As time passed and little was accomplished (and that gradually), the tone of the opposition rose and the Shah shattered the coalition with the "élite" by moving against their position in the Majlis.

This was done in the 1960 elections through the ingenious device of creating a two-party system to replace the fragmentation of Iranian politics. Both parties were created from the top by the Shah, one, *Melliun*, led by the Premier, Manoucher Eghbal, and the other, the "opposition," led by a long and close associate of the Shah, Assadollah Alam, under the name *Mardom*. The candidates of both parties were carefully selected to exclude obstructionist deputies as well as any other persons who might seriously challenge the regime. Then the elections were to be free, with the major and vital qualification that only the two parties were to be in the field.

The scheme satisfied the need to hold the scheduled elections, and to rid the Majlis of obstruction, and promised to relieve the government of the onus and dangerous emotions that rigged and police-controlled elections in the past had brought on. It failed dramatically due to the stubbornness and disregard of risk of the "élite" whose base of independent power was threatened. The "élite" defied the Shah and insisted on the right to run outside of the two-party framework, which might have been expected. They also used their power to protect and sponsor the re-emergence of the radical leaders of the left, in jail, administrative exile or under close police surveillance since 1953, onto the political arena. Members of the "élite" and leaders of the left, including the new National Front, together denounced the elections and the left stirred the public and emotional response which the "élite" could not evoke. With victory in his grasp at the end of August, 1960, the Shah backed down and cancelled the elections rather than run the growing risk of an explosion of violence in the streets of Teheran with both the left and the "right" sharply against him.³

In doing so, the Shah garnered the fruits of defeat with the anger and opposition that victory might have brought. The left and the whole middle class were enormously excited and encouraged by the Shah's first real defeat and their first success in seven years. The opposition emotion upon which the National Front rides was given its surge. At the same time, the Shah had made it clear to his allies in the "élite" that he would strike them down, while they in turn had

³ A more detailed account of the election can be found in the present writer's "Politics and Elections in Iran," *Middle East Journal*, Spring, 1961, pp. 153-164.

made it clear to the Shah that they would risk the total disaster of mob rule. A similar incident in 1950–1951, when the "élite" had backed the radical left against General Razmara's reform government, had done much to bring on Mossadegh and the mob rule of his time that almost brought total disaster to both Shah and "élite." The repetition in 1960 was a deeply serious act.

On this ground of deep distrust for and from the members of the "élite," the Shah then had to turn to maintain order through an uncertain Army which he could not balance against the "élite." Assigned much of the blame for the elections, Premier Eghbal resigned, and the depth of the Shah's perplexity is shown by his choice for a replacement. At a moment demanding a mature politician and one of wide influence, the choice fell upon an economic technician, Sherif-Imami, whose distinction was that he alone in Eghbal's Cabinet had stayed aloof from the political struggle. With politicians so deeply at odds, a non-political type was needed.

Amini was one of the most prominent of the "élite" to challenge the Shah in the elections and one of those who directly lent his support to radicals of the Left. He helped defeat the Shah and hence helped to bring on the crisis in which the Shah, eventually and in some desperation, would bring him to office. Equally, his actions furthered the fragmentation of the political society into the maze of antagonistic and shifting factions and individuals who compose his opposition and whose existence simultaneously permits him to retain power without a solid base of support.

A second and economic crisis burst almost at the same time. Eghbal's Cabinet for some time had been actively seeking public support, through unchecked import of luxury goods and a deaf ear for the spiraling commercial speculation in Teheran, among other things. By early 1960, these policies had brought a serious drop in reserves of foreign exchange and the danger of a financial panic, but as the coming need for public support in the key elections was great, harsh and unpopular fiscal measures were avoided. Sherif-Imami inherited the now-acute need for such measures.

The new Premier undertook the task with

a will and characteristic technical ability, but under truly difficult circumstances. Bankruptcies had begun in the bazaar and measures to correct the fiscal situation accelerated them into a financial panic and a growing problem of unemployment. At the same time, the government was reimposing a cautious repression and was impelled to hold new elections. These were held under close military and police control but in a tense situation during January and February, 1961, after a series of compromises had been struck with powerful members of the "élite." Rather than settling the issue of elections and permitting the Majlis to resume, however, these procedures heightened opposition and gave the National Front new appeal.

The Amini Regime

Then on May 2, 1961, a demonstration of the teacher's union for higher pay in the Majlis Square led to an otherwise small incident in which a police officer lost his nerve and shot one man. In two days, this had become a *cause célèbre* for the opposition and mass demonstrations were under way. The Shah dropped Sherif-Imami rather than test the Army, and called Amini to office. Amini began by securing the Shah's dissolution of the Majlis and promising new and free elections. He also announced that repression was ended. Within two weeks the National Front had held a mass demonstration directed as much against Amini as for him and the press had proceeded to predict, directly and indirectly, either revolution from below or a coup from the Army, neither of which Amini wanted provoked in the slightest.

Gradually restrictions on the press were reimposed, mass demonstrations banned, with a sharp clash with the National Front on this point in July; and the prospect of elections was set far in the future. Amini, in power, found himself up against much of the same problems he had helped bring down upon the Shah.

United States Policy

The United States, as far as the public record of such recent events tells the story, has had relatively little influence or role in the present crisis. This seems largely due to what has been called the "limits of foreign

policy," but it is also in part due to the role of the United States in Iran in the past. Past actions and involvement have borne on the extent of present influence.

The United States played an important role in facilitating the overthrow of Mossadegh and then strongly supported the succeeding regime of General Zahedi. In an emergency aid program, the United States supported the Iranian budget at the rate of some \$5 million per month, or roughly half the budget. Then, with progress on economic development virtually stalled, corruption rife and evidence of growing opposition, the United States moved to disengage itself from such close association with the Iranian government. Beginning in January, 1955, American aid was gradually but steadily diverted away from the budget to the Seven-Year Plan Organization charged with development. The thrust of American policy was that Iran should concentrate upon development as the medicine for her rather obvious ills.

As American aid was diverted from the budget to development, oil revenues from the revived industry began to flow. These were to be devoted to development, but the government shifted them to the budget. As the United States shifted its funds in one direction, Iran undertook to shift its own resources in the contrary fashion and the two roughly balanced each other out. This evoked some considerable irritation in the government of the United States and Iranian requests for increased aid to get development going were treated somewhat coolly. Then Kassim overthrew the monarchy in Iraq and the United States began to take a greater interest in assistance, notably military, to Iran.

This renewed interest seems to have cooled again by the time of the 1960 elections. At this critical testing point, the United States

seems to have adopted a policy of careful disinterest in the outcome of the Shah's plans. Disinterest may even be too strong a word, for the American preoccupation throughout the precipitation of the crisis was heavily on the emerging crisis in foreign exchange, which meant, of course, a sharp curtailment of development or a large expansion of American or other aid. If anything, as the elections came to a close which was to be disastrous, the United States was largely occupied in urging Premier Eghbal to undertake difficult and unpopular measures of fiscal stringency. Since the crisis has been underway, the United States has made some \$60 million available, largely by accelerating the date of availability on loans committed at an earlier date.

What then the future? As this is read, part of the answer may already have been given. Part is forecast in the Shah's *firman* of six points under which Amini governs. One of these points stresses the establishment and improvement of town and village councils. It cannot be read without a thought of Ayub Khan's experiment in Pakistan with "basic democracies" in the villages, an effort to build a representative political system from the bottom up. That this will work in Iran, without the strict military rule which has surrounded it in Pakistan, remains to be seen and perhaps tested. Its appeal is not inherent, but lies in the lack of alternatives from which to start in so fragmented a political society, now that the Shah's effort at a two-party system has been so thoroughly dashed and discredited. Amini cannot continue indefinitely, one would guess, surrounded by divided opposition. Either he will find some means to reduce the fragmentation in the political system or his opponents, in time, will reduce it by coalescing against him, at least for the act of destruction.

(Continued from p. 226)

palities, with Greco-Turkish councils resolving questions affecting both communities. Cyprus agreed "not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever." Greece, Turkey and Britain guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus and undertook to insure that Cyprus would

not seek union with another country nor attempt partition. If efforts to implement the latter undertakings should prove fruitless, each of the three powers reserved the right of intervention. Cyprus, Greece and Turkey agreed to respect British sovereignty over British bases on Cyprus which Britain retained.

"In the course of the last decade it has seemed that to the extent that Egypt occupied herself with Arab affairs, she held back her social-economic revolution at home," writes this specialist. "For this reason Syria's secession from the U.A.R. may in the long run prove more advantageous to Egypt than most observers have thought."

The Egyptian Revolution

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I

IT WAS nearly ten years ago that a handful of young Egyptian army officers carried out a successful *coup d'état* which put an end to the monarchial regime of the Alawi dynasty and initiated a wholly new phase in modern Egyptian history. The professed purpose of the *coup d'état* was to root out corruption from the government, reinstitute justice and order, and hand over the reins of government to "clean, honest" leaders. It was emphasized that normal political life was to be reestablished after a short period of transition and that the army was to withdraw from politics and return to its barracks.

What the young officers failed to realize was that, once seized, power immediately imposes a claim upon those who wield it: initial goals and intentions lose their relevance and new demands and goals force themselves upon the new leadership. To capture power is in a real sense to be captured by it. Once dictatorship is established its first involvement is with *means*; and it is from this involvement with means that new ends evolve

and the nature and character of the regime is derived. To these army officers neither Arab nationalism nor socialism were objectives of the *coup d'état*; yet in the decade that followed they came to dominate the political life of the Nasser regime.

It can be safely maintained that until Nasser's espousal of Arab nationalism the idea of Arab nationalism had been foreign to most Egyptians.¹ In its origin and growth Egyptian nationalism followed quite a separate course from that of Arab nationalism, which developed almost exclusively in the Asian part of the Arab world, with Damascus as its ideological center. In his *Philosophy of the Revolution*,² Nasser did not once use the term *al-qawmiyyah al-'arabiyyah* (Arab nationalism); when he referred to the Arabs he thought of them in terms of Egyptian policy as it applied to the three fields of action, the Arab, the African and the Muslim, in which Egypt was "designed to play a major role." In a speech in 1956, Nasser clearly said that in carrying out the *coup d'état*, "I had only one intention, Egypt's interests."³

It is not going too far to say that Egypt's shift from Egyptian nationalism to Arab nationalism was the direct result of Nasser's personal "conversion" to the principle of Arab nationalism. It is of course impossible to tell how this "conversion" actually took place, but the time and circumstances during which it occurred can be clearly indicated.

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¹ On this general topic see Anwar G. Chejne, "Egyptian Attitudes toward pan-Arabism," *Middle East Journal* (Summer, 1957), 253-263.

² *Falsafat al-thawra* (Cairo, 1953).

³ *Collected Speeches* (Cairo, 1960) [in Arabic], 123.

Until 1958, Nasser was viewed in the Arab world as an Egyptian leader working for Egypt's good; he was one of the leaders of the Arab world and as such was supported and admired; he had not yet projected that image of the leader of the Arabs, the national saviour, the new Saladin. This concept evolved as the result of a series of events, which put Nasser in a new light both with regard to the Arab masses and with regard to his own conception of his role in the Arab world. The most salient of these events, which took place between 1955 and 1957, were: the arms deal with Czechoslovakia (September, 1955), which almost overnight made Egypt potentially one of the strongest military powers in the Middle East; the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, which symbolized the greatest defiance a small nation could hurl in the face of the great powers; the Suez war, from which Egypt emerged in 1957 triumphant (in spite of the Sinai defeat).⁴ Nasser's response to Arab acclaim was warm and direct; his call for Arab cooperation now became a call for complete Arab unity. The Syrians, and particularly the *Baath* (Arab Resurrection Socialist) party, the most articulate nationalist movement in the Arab world, declared Nasser the leader of resurgent Arab nationalism and the symbol of Arab unity. His adoption of the *Baath* "Damascus" brand of Arab nationalism gave his conversion a doctrinal content and set his new political orientation on a new foundation, which in 1958 resulted in the creation of the United Arab Republic and the drive to complete Arab unity.

II

The setback to Nasser's leadership in the Arab world came suddenly and soon, long before Syria's revolt in September, 1961. In itself, the Syrian-Egyptian union was only a first step, which, if not carried farther, was meaningless in terms of pan-Arab unity; in order to exist the U.A.R. had to grow, and the natural direction of growth was in the Fertile Crescent—in Lebanon, Jordan and

⁴ Until February, 1955, when an Israeli force attacked an Egyptian outpost within the Gaza strip, Egypt's attitude toward Israel had seemed to most Arabs exceptionally mild; Egypt treated the Palestine problem as just another important problem, not as the central national issue—an attitude which was transformed especially after Sinai.

Iraq. The crucial decision in these countries was made in the summer of 1958. Jordan was rocked by a series of attempts to bring down the Hashimite monarchy; Lebanon was plunged into civil war; and Iraq experienced a military *coup d'état* which toppled the pro-Western regime of Nuri al-Sa'id. But the outcome of these events was unfavorable to the U.A.R.: King Hussein's position, which for awhile seemed desperate, was strengthened; in Lebanon a compromise between the pro-Nasser Muslim faction and the separatist Christian groups led to the consolidation of Lebanese independence; and in Iraq, the most important country in this configuration, the new revolutionary regime, after a short period of friendship with Nasser, broke with the U.A.R. The Cairo-Baghdad rivalry was resumed with new fury.

With their hopes frustrated, the Egyptians now resorted to desperate methods to bolster Nasser's declining prestige. Tactics included diatribes on the Voice of the Arabs, open support of Shawwaf's anti-Kassim uprising in Iraq (March, 1959), and ringleadership throughout the area in incidents of subversion and violence such as the dynamiting in Amman of the prime minister's office which cost many lives including that of the Jordanian premier (August, 1960). Meanwhile, as the drive toward Arab unity began to meet with reverses, relations between Syrians and Egyptians also started to deteriorate. The U.A.R. was beginning to crack at the seams.

III

The stability of any revolutionary regime can be assumed as long as internal conflict and disagreement remain confined *within* the system; once internal tension enlarges sufficiently to assume the form of *opposition to* the system itself, the very basis of the regime is threatened, ironically, by its own petard. It is probable that internal tension in Syria could have been maintained within the system or union, if in the summer of 1961 the move toward socialism had not been forced upon the Syrians. Nasser's "socialization decrees," however, served to transform the already existing tension to all-out opposition. On September 30, 1961, this

erupted in a Syrian army *coup d'état* that put an end to the Egyptian-Syrian union.

I must add that Syria's revolt was not against Nasser's "tyranny." It is true that Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj, Nasser's most loyal supporter in Syria until August, 1961, and chief of internal security, had established in Syria perhaps the most efficient secret police in the Arab world; that the appointment of Egyptian officers to high positions in the Syrian First Army inevitably alienated many Syrian officers; that Egyptian teachers and civil servants, sent in thousands to Syria, served to make Egyptian dominance acutely felt by the mass of the population. Yet the fundamental problem was not really so much one of freedom vs. tyranny, of democracy vs. dictatorship, but an essentially technical problem, having more to do with administrative structures and planning than with ideas and personalities. It was also, as in all revolutionary regimes, a problem of legitimacy.

In seizing power revolutionary dictators are committed to two lines of conduct: they must promise a better future and must then justify themselves by their accomplishment in attaining that future. The difficulties that Nasser encountered were caused not by the necessity to safeguard the old principles of legality (which had been violated by the *coup d'état*), but by the need to establish new principles strong enough to serve as sufficient basis for the continued possession of power. In Egypt, as in other countries of the Middle East, the effort has been to replace the old "corrupt democracy" of the former feudal regime by a new "true democracy" able to safeguard and uphold the goals of the revolution. Democracy as a form of government has never been repudiated; on the contrary, in every instance the people's sovereignty has been declared the final repository of power. But it is clear that the democracy which was here denounced was the form of parliamentary democracy which the Western powers introduced into the Middle East after the First World War. The democracy now advocated is "guided democracy," the democracy based on a single party, dominated by absolute leadership.

IV

The Egyptian type of "guided democracy" represents in its development the three phases through which the new revolutionary dictatorships have to pass to establish bases of legitimacy. The first phase consists, as already indicated, in the intention of the new holders of power to clean up government and restore normal political life based on accepted constitutional procedures. The second phase begins with the realization that the clock cannot be put back and that, once possessed, power has to be used. Not only do the military fail to return to their barracks, but a military dictatorship now emerges, and with it a new bureaucracy and ruling class composed mostly of military officers; all political parties are dissolved, censorship is imposed and an indefinite period of transition is decreed. The third phase is the phase of social and political reconstruction along totally new lines; alongside basic economic and social reforms, political reorganization begins: the single party is organized, a new constitution is drafted, and elections, in the form of limited plebiscites, are carried out; the third phase ends with the emergence of a national assembly and the establishment of *de facto* power in new institutions and hierarchical structures.

It took five years in Egypt to complete this three-fold process. By early 1953 the purged Wafd party and the Muslim Brotherhood, incapable of maintaining their initial advantages, gave way to the first single party, the National Rally. Poorly conceived and inefficiently organized, the National Rally was replaced by the National Union which served as the basis for the first Egyptian parliament. The first plebiscite, which took place on June 13, 1956, approved the new constitution and Gamal Abdel Nasser as president of the republic (a simple "Yes" or "No" answer to the questions: do you approve the constitution? do you approve of Gamal Abdel Nasser as president of the republic?). Elections for the National Assembly were carried out in 1957 (of 2,528 candidates, over a thousand were disqualified by a special committee headed by the President). The new assembly, which convened in July, 1957, functioned for less than a year and was dissolved as a result of the

Syrian-Egyptian merger (February, 1958).

With the establishment of the U.A.R. the same process was repeated: The first step was to approve the union and Nasser as president of the U.A.R., by a plebiscite carried out simultaneously in Egypt and Syria (99.9 per cent of the electorate voted approval in Egypt, 99.8 per cent in Syria); this was followed by the dissolution of all political parties in Syria and the establishment of a Syrian branch of the National Union; and elections for the U.A.R. national assembly took place in July, 1960 (400 members from the Egyptian region, 200 from the Syrian region). A little over a year later, in September, 1961, this assembly was automatically dissolved with the severance of the union.

The new pattern of representation recently devised in Egypt follows the lines of the original National Union, but, significantly, with special emphasis on the peasant and working classes. In the projected National Congress of Popular Forces (*al-mu'tamar al-watani li qiwa al-sha'b*), which is to serve as the new basis of national representation, over half of the 1500 seats are reserved for peasants, industrial workers and trade unionists; the remaining seats are divided among civil servants, teachers and professors, women, and businessmen.

V

It has by now become evident that in Egypt, as in all post-war revolutionary regimes from Indonesia to Tunisia, the tendency in political life is to devise a system which will strengthen and centralize, not diffuse, political power. Democracy, based as it is in its Western variety on discussion and the pluralistic system of political parties, has no place in these revolutionary régimes. However, the system of guided or controlled democracy under benevolent dictatorships is not to be construed as another form of totalitarianism; neither in theory nor in actual practice does it offer a political or social or economic doctrine which it upholds as the only true and valid doctrine for society. It can be said that these régimes generally fall between the rightist paternalism of Franco's Spain and the leftist dictatorship of Tito's Yugoslavia, but none of them can

be rightly compared with the former Fascist régimes in Italy and Germany or with the Communist régimes in Russia or China.

The true revolutionary character of these Afro-Asian régimes reveals itself not so much in the political as in the social and economic spheres of action and planning. In fact, the necessity for the centralization of power in all these countries is justified less in terms of political organization than in terms of social and economic reform. This is largely due to the predominance after the Second World War of the concept of the welfare state instead of the fashionable doctrines, current in the interwar period, which had stressed political theory rather than economic development.

In Egypt, as in all underdeveloped countries, private capital is neither financially able nor morally ready to undertake large-scale economic development (it tends to invest only where it is assured of quick and sizeable returns); thus the government is the only agency in the state that can assume the power and responsibility for the vast, long-term projects of social and economic development, needed in all underdeveloped countries. Egypt, perhaps more than any other country in the world, suffers from such population pressure that its entire future may depend on the scale and speed with which it can develop its water and mineral resources to stem the already declining standard of living of its people.

In the course of the last decade it has seemed that to the extent that Egypt occupied herself with Arab affairs, she held back her social-economic revolution at home. For this reason Syria's secession from the U.A.R. may in the long run prove more advantageous to Egypt than most observers have thought. Becoming free from Arab involvement, Nasser is now free from the contradictions which Egypt's presence in Syria had created for him; he is in a far better position to carry the social revolution at home to its logical conclusion. The shift therefore from the slogan of "Arab nationalism" to that of "Arab socialism" represents something far more fundamental than a mere change in political tactics. To Egypt this has meant setting the revolution back on its proper tracks and embarking on a new

phase of social and political development. Egyptian socialism, which really began to take shape only after the promulgation of the "socialization decrees" in July and August, 1961, is not "socialism" in the technical European sense of the word. It is not based on a clearcut doctrine and is mostly pragmatic and eclectic in approach. All large firms, industries, banks have been nationalized and individual land-holdings limited to 100 acres, but limited free enterprise has been preserved. What the system has now made clear is that no one can become or continue to be rich in Egypt.⁵ The destruction of the rich and privileged classes has produced a tremendous psychological change in the national attitude. For the first time in Egypt's long history the humble masses, the peasants and laborers who constitute the vast majority of the population, have been integrated into the Egyptian body social. Nasser's recent statement, "More socialism means more freedom," is certainly true when viewed in terms of this revolutionary process of social transformation.

VI

How is the achievement of the Egyptian revolution to be assessed?

There are four major fields in which Nasser's leadership has played a significant role during the last ten years: the East-West struggle as it concerned the Middle East; the Arab-Israeli conflict; inter-Arab relations; and Egypt's internal situation.

(1) In the first field, Nasser's most significant achievement consists in setting up the principle of positive neutralism and non-alignment as the basis of Arab policy with regard to East and West. The West's exclusive position in the Middle East has ended largely as a result of Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact but more directly by his appeal for Soviet military and economic aid (September, 1955), which almost overnight turned Russia into a Middle Eastern power and gave her a new role in African and Asian affairs.

By adhering to strict neutrality, however, Nasser showed the rising nations of Africa

and Asia that there was little danger in dealing with the Eastern bloc, as long as a country was in a position to do so on its own terms, and that there was much to gain from a policy of non-alignment that brought aid from both sides without commitment to either. The success of Nasser's policies resulted by the end of the 1950's in a form of coexistence between East and West in the Middle East so that the region entered into a phase of genuine internal autonomy which it had not known since Napoleon's invasion of Egypt a century and a half before.

(2) A major cause of Nasser's rise to Arab leadership is to be attributed to the Arabs' fear of Israel; after the Sinai defeat and gradual fading away of the Arabs' hopes for a "second round," Nasser's appeal began to weaken. His popularity among the Arab masses had in large part rested on his promise to act in restoring Arab rights in Palestine. Egypt's retreat from this promise began in 1957, with her acquiescence in the sealing-off of the Egyptian-Israeli frontier by the United Nations international force. In actual fact, to Egypt Israel is a major concern only in relation to two factors: Egypt's prestige in the Arab world and Egyptian national security. Since among the surrounding Arab countries Egypt's security is the least threatened by Israel, it is possible that Egypt's attitude toward Israel may undergo some change. It would seem likely that now, after Egypt's frustration in her bid for Arab leadership, motives of national interest rather than the former crusading impulses of Arab nationalism would tend to predominate in Egypt with regard to this problem.

(3) The course of Nasser's leadership of the movement of Arab unity has had two clear results in the area as a whole: it has served to bring about the collapse of the emotional extremist brand of Arab nationalism which aimed at total Arab unity from Morocco to Iraq; it has also revived the more realistic concept of Arab nationalism which visualized it as a movement of inter-Arab cooperation rather than of total unity and preferred to base it on graduated moves of economic, cultural and military federation.

It was not so much Nasser himself who

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⁵ In a survey made by a leading Cairo weekly to determine what the common man thought of *al-işhtirakiyah* (socialism), a typical answer given by an unskilled laborer was: "Socialism means that everybody can now eat and that there are no longer any rich people." *Rose al-Yussif*, December 4, 1961.

Current Documents

THE CONVENTION ON THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

On December 14, 1960, the United States, Canada and the members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation agreed on a convention which reconstituted the Organization for European Economic Cooperation as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.¹ The complete text of the Convention follows:

THE GOVERNMENTS of the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Iceland, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Swiss Confederation, the Turkish Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America;

CONSIDERING that economic strength and prosperity are essential for the attainment of the purposes of the United Nations, the preservation of individual liberty and the increase of general well-being;

BELIEVING that they can further these aims most effectively by strengthening the tradition of co-operation which has evolved among them;

RECOGNIZING that the economic recovery and progress of Europe to which their participation in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation has made a major contribution, have opened new perspectives for strengthening that tradition and applying it to new tasks and broader objectives;

CONVINCED that broader co-operation will make a vital contribution to peaceful and harmonious relations among the peoples of the world;

RECOGNIZING the increasing interdependence of their economies;

¹ This is a continuation of the documentary material presented in the March, 1962, issue where the text of the Communiqué on the O.E.C.D. issued by the U.S., Canada and the members of the O.E.E.C. on December 14, 1960, was reprinted.

DETERMINED by consultation and co-operation to use more effectively their capacities and potentialities so as to promote the highest sustainable growth of their economies and improve the economic and social well-being of their peoples;

BELIEVING that the economically more advanced nations should co-operate in assisting to the best of their ability the countries in process of economic development;

RECOGNIZING that the further expansion of world trade is one of the most important factors favoring the economic development of countries and the improvement of international economic relations; and

DETERMINED to pursue these purposes in a manner consistent with their obligations in other international organizations or institutions in which they participate or under agreements to which they are a party;

HAVE THEREFORE AGREED on the following provisions for the reconstitution of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development:

Article 1

The aims of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter called the "Organization") shall be to promote policies designed:

(a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;

(b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member

countries in the process of economic development; and

(c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.

Article 2

In the pursuit of these aims, the Members agree that they will, both individually and jointly:

(a) promote the efficient use of their economic resources;

(b) in the scientific and technological field, promote the development of their resources, encourage research and promote vocational training;

(c) pursue policies designed to achieve economic growth and internal and external financial stability and to avoid developments which might endanger their economies or those of other countries;

(d) pursue their efforts to reduce or abolish obstacles to the exchange of goods and services and current payments and maintain and extend the liberalization of capital movements; and

(e) contribute to the economic development of both Member and non-member countries in the process of economic development by appropriate means and, in particular, by the flow of capital to those countries, having regard to the importance to their economies of receiving technical assistance and of securing expanding export markets.

Article 3

With a view to achieving the aims set out in Article 1 and to fulfilling the undertakings contained in Article 2, the Members agree that they will:

(a) keep each other informed and furnish the Organization with the information necessary for the accomplishment of its tasks;

(b) consult together on a continuing basis, carry out studies and participate in agreed projects; and

(c) co-operate closely and where appropriate take coordinated action.

Article 4

The Contracting Parties to this Convention shall be Members of the Organization.

Article 5

In order to achieve its aims, the Organization may:

(a) take decisions which, except as otherwise provided, shall be binding on all the Members;

(b) make recommendations to Members; and

(c) enter into agreements with Members, non-member States and international organizations.

Article 6

1. Unless the Organization otherwise agrees unanimously for special cases, decisions shall be taken and recommendations shall be made by mutual agreement of all the Members.

2. Each Member shall have one vote. If a Member abstains from voting on a decision or recommendation, such abstention shall not invalidate the decision or recommendation, which shall be applicable to the other Members but not to the abstaining Member.

3. No decision shall be binding on any Member until it has complied with the requirements of its own constitutional procedures. The other Members may agree that such a decision shall apply provisionally to them.

Article 7

A Council composed of all the Members shall be the body from which all acts of the Organization derive. The council may meet in sessions of Ministers or of Permanent Representatives.

Article 8

The Council shall designate each year a Chairman, who shall preside at its ministerial sessions, and two Vice-Chairmen. The Chairmen may be designated to serve one additional consecutive term.

Article 9

The Council may establish an Executive Committee and such subsidiary bodies as may be required for the achievement of the aims of the Organization.

Article 10

1. A Secretary-General responsible to the Council shall be appointed by the Council

for a term of five years. He shall be assisted by one or more Deputy Secretaries-General or Assistant Secretaries-General appointed by the Council on the recommendation of the Secretary-General.

2. The Secretary-General shall serve as Chairman of the Council meeting at sessions of Permanent Representatives. He shall assist the Council in all appropriate ways and may submit proposals to the Council or to any other body of the Organization.

Article 11

1. The Secretary-General shall appoint such staff as the Organization may require in accordance with plans of organization approved by the Council. Staff regulations shall be subject to approval by the Council.

2. Having regard to the international character of the Organization, the Secretary-General, the Deputy or Assistant Secretaries-General and the staff shall neither seek nor receive instructions from any of the Members or from any Government or authority external to the Organization.

Article 12

Upon such terms and conditions as the Council may determine, the Organization may:

- (a) address communications to non-member States or organizations;
- (b) establish and maintain relations with non-member States or organizations; and
- (c) invite non-member Governments or organizations to participate in activities of the Organization.

Article 13

Representation in the Organization of the European Communities established by the Treaties of Paris and Rome of 18th April, 1951, and 25th March, 1957, shall be as defined in Supplementary Protocol No. 1 to this Convention.

Article 14

1. This Convention shall be ratified or accepted by the Signatories in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

2. Instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited with the Government

of the French Republic, hereby designated as depositary Government.

3. This Convention shall come into force:

(a) before 30th September, 1961, upon the deposit of instruments of ratification or acceptance by all the Signatories; or

(b) on 30th September, 1961, if by that date fifteen Signatories or more have deposited such instruments as regards those Signatories; and thereafter as regards any other Signatory upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance;

(c) after 30th September, 1961, but not later than two years from the signature of this Convention, upon the deposit of such instruments by fifteen Signatories, as regards those Signatories; and thereafter as regards any other Signatory upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance.

4. Any Signatory which has not deposited its instrument of ratification or acceptance when the Convention comes into force may take part in the activities of the Organization upon conditions to be determined by agreement between the Organization and such Signatory.

Article 15

When this Convention comes into force the reconstitution of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation shall take effect, and its aims, organs, powers and name shall thereupon be as provided herein. The legal personality possessed by the Organization for European Economic Co-operation shall continue in the Organization, but decisions, recommendations and resolutions of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation shall require approval of the Council to be effective after the coming into force of this Convention.

Article 16

The Council may decide to invite any Government prepared to assume the obligations of membership to accede to this Convention. Such decisions shall be unanimous, provided that for any particular case the Council may unanimously decide to permit abstention, in which case, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 6, the decision shall be applicable to all the Members. Accession shall take effect upon the deposit of an instru-

ment of accession with the depositary Government.

Article 17

Any Contracting Party may terminate the application of this Convention to itself by giving twelve months' notice to that effect to the depositary Government.

Article 18

The Headquarters of the Organization shall be in Paris, unless the Council agrees otherwise.

Article 19

The legal capacity of the Organization and the privileges, exemptions and immunities of the Organization, its officials and representatives to it of the Members shall be as provided in Supplementary Protocol No. 2 to this Convention.

Article 20

1. Each year, in accordance with Financial Regulations adopted by the Council, the Secretary-General shall present to the Council for approval an annual budget, accounts,

and such subsidiary budgets as the Council shall request.

2. General expenses of the Organization, as agreed by the Council, shall be apportioned in accordance with a scale to be decided upon by the Council. Other expenditure shall be financed on such basis as the Council may decide.

Article 21

Upon the receipt of any instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession, or of any notice of termination, the depositary Government shall give notice thereof to all the Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the Organization.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly empowered, have appended their signatures to this Convention.

DONE in Paris, this 14th day of December Nineteen Hundred and Sixty, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall be deposited with the Government of the French Republic by whom certified copies will be communicated to all the Signatories.

(Continued from p. 237)

proved a disappointment to Arab nationalists as the *Baath "Damascene"* concept of Arab nationalism for which he accepted the role of spokesman. For almost half a century Arab nationalists have maintained that all Arab countries would willingly give up their individual sovereignty and unite in a single nation, and that such a natural and inevitable move was always obstructed by the "imperialists." The career of the Egyptian-Syrian union has served to initiate what may well be the first serious self-examination that the movement of Arab nationalism has experienced since its inception.

(4) There seems little doubt that Nasser's and the Egyptian revolution's most lasting achievement lies in the field of internal economic and social reform. In Egypt, for the first time in the history of any Arab nation, the cause of the common man has been wholeheartedly upheld by the state against the interests of the privileged classes. In

this respect, in the next 50 years the social revolution in Egypt, if continued, will probably have a more radical influence in shaping Arab and Middle Eastern society than any direct action that Nasser has taken or may take in the region on the purely political level.

It matters little whether or not Egypt's "Arab socialism" is true socialism in the doctrinaire sense; the revolution has already begun to transform the social and economic fabric of Egyptian society. Indeed, it is not surprising that the bitterest attacks on "Arab socialism" have come from the Arab Communists (spearheaded by Beirut's vociferous Communist press). For here is an Arab alternative to Communist socialism carried out by the largest and strongest of the Arab countries in the Middle East. As the *Economist* has pointed out, Egypt's brand of socialism, whatever its nature, may prove to be "one of the most formidable barriers to the Soviet Union's political penetration of the Arab World, and possibly of the African World too."⁶

⁶ August 19, 1961.

Received At Our Desk

History and Politics . . .

AFRICA AND THE VICTORIANS. By RONALD ROBINSON AND JOHN GALLAGHER. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961. 491 pages, index and tables, \$9.00.)

This important, fascinating and learned book, the work of two Cambridge scholars, sets out to reconsider the manner and the motives of Britain's colonial advance in Africa during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. The paradox it stresses is that "the climax of imperialism in the Dark Continent" came not during Britain's time of supremacy and self-confidence in the first three-quarters of the century, but at the beginning of a period of decline; and that it was less concerned with opening fresh fields to Britain's economy and power, than with defending the fruits of earlier, positive enterprise.

Along with a subtle and nuanced interpretation of the official minds presiding over this process or, rather, seeking to cope with it, the authors offer a persuasive re-interpretation of the accepted view of imperial expansion during this time. The conventional tale of colonial enterprise presents the flag following trader and missionary, economic ends being served by political means. Robinson and Gallagher set this theory on its head, showing how, over and over again, commercial interests or "vague notions of civilizing Africa and opening new markets" were enlisted to strengthen Britain's imperial position and serve Whitehall's plans.

Economic or sentimental ends were incidental to political ones in a game where ministers and officials in London, far from trailing the traders, used, spurred or ignored them according to greater national or international needs. "So far from commercial expansion requiring the extension of territorial claims, it was the extension

of territorial claims which in time required commercial expansion. The arguments of the so-called new imperialism were *ex post facto* justifications of advances, they were not the original reason for making them."

The Empire of the 1880's and the 1890's grew out of the difficulty of asserting a less costly influence over territories where local authorities had been crushed between European pressures and national reaction against foreigners. When the old supremacy by influence, dear to free trade hearts, no longer worked, a new supremacy had to be established. Colonial as in Nigeria, "veiled protectorate" as in Egypt, operating through local governments or Chartered Companies as it did in southern Africa, Power came into its own. Like Ireland, the Empire must be held, by persuasion if possible, by force if need be. Once Providence and the laws of progress ceased to work on Britain's side, the Army and the Navy had to do. "Having failed to find willing partners by policy, the Victorians condemned them to be involuntary subjects."

These things and many others we learn from a book invaluable not only to the student of British and African affairs, but also of the international scene in the late nineteenth century. The book has to be read. Thanks to the author's style, the duty is a pleasure.

E.W.

THE STRUGGLE FOR ALGERIA. By JOSEPH KRAFT. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1961. 263 pages, \$4.50.)
FRANCE AND ALGERIA. COMPLEMENTARY ENEMIES. By GERMAINE TILLION. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961. 183 pages, \$3.00.)

The Algerian conflict, now in its seventh year, has produced a mass of writing, largely polemical, that generates on the

whole more heat than light. The two books under review are among the better recent exceptions to the rule, and one can gain by reading them together.

Both books concern—and concern themselves with—France more than Algeria; and this is perfectly proper since France is Algeria's Dr. Frankenstein. She has made it what it is, she has given it its best and worst, and nationalist rebels who rose against French indifference, injustice, and oppression drew their inspiration from French ideas of liberty and social justice which they had learned from French teachers in French schools.

Mr. Kraft, writing for an American audience, goes into the historical background of the conflict in some detail, devoting a great deal of space to the metropolitan politics which both before and after May 13, 1958, decided the fate of the war-wracked country and were in turn affected by it. His is not a book for specialists, but for intelligent laymen in search of information. Such readers can turn to Mr. Kraft for an account of the problem as it developed on both sides of the Mediterranean, not only since 1954, but since 1827. They will find it clear, simple, and generally accurate despite a slew of misprints. However, those who know better can correct minor mistakes as they read, and others will care little if Albin Chalandon appears as Albert Chalandin, or if Guy Mollet's Parliamentary defeat of October, 1957, which opened the way to the cabinet of M. Félix Gaillard, is placed in 1958.

The detailed political account of the steps towards rebellion would have gained by a glance at the economic psychology of the situation as it developed. The murderous and crucial Sétif riots of 1945 can be better understood in light of the famine raging at the time and the presence in Sétif (it was a market day) of hungry tribesmen from the parched surrounding countryside. But ignorance of Muslims is Mr. Kraft's chief weakness, and this makes itself felt throughout the book. Little though he likes the European settlers, or the rough and rebellious Army, they are fleshed out and characterized in detail their opponents lack. This leaves the Mus-

lim in a secondary place, his psychology, his activity, and also his misdeeds too often ignored whilst his oppressors appear like Lucifer, endowed with all the glamor of embattled evil.

Such shortcomings are not to be found in the essay of Mlle. Tillion, well-acquainted as ethnographer and sociologist with both of the complementary enemies she discusses. Written with deceptive simplicity for a French public familiar with the basic facts, her book recapitulates a record of failure, of sickness spreading through an ill-balanced body, to give us an analysis of modern society that is valid for other countries beside Algeria—or France.

With most elements of her tale we are already familiar: the progressive abdication of the French State, afraid of driving the settlers to rebellion and only exasperating them into even further brutality; the cowardice and ineptitude of the Left; the futile stupidity of the Right. But Germaine Tillion reveals the conflict's crux: the gradual, deliberate divorce of the Muslim and European communities, the repression (while there was still a chance for integration) of integrationist velleities among Algerian intellectuals, finally the growth of the *fear that breeds fear* and its concomitants, leading at last to a war whose casualties can no longer be counted.

Her description of the pathetic, murderous hysteria that prevailed in both communities after 1956 is especially good, each side's excesses exciting the other to greater extremes. In this terror-tournament one French Republic has lost its life; another is well on the way to losing its honor. But Mlle. Tillion also shows that among the first and most important victims were French justice—which never appeared in a more miserable light—and French public opinion which has seldom been more un- and ill- and mis-informed. And she shows too the extraordinary vigor and courage of French liberalism and sheer human decency, of which she is an outstanding—and lucid—representative.

Her thesis, on the other hand, is not completely convincing. First, as Mr. Kraft asserts, there is little evidence to suppose that concessions to the Muslims would

have cut off nationalist growth. Secondly, whilst Algeria's need for France is clear enough, France's need of Algeria is more of a moral argument than a fact. Yet a moral attitude too can be a fact; and one which, as Mlle. Tillion demonstrates, deserves respectful attention.

E.W.

FALANGE: A HISTORY OF SPANISH FASCISM. By STANLEY G. PAYNE. (Stanford: University Press, 1961. 316, ix pages, bibliography and index, \$6.00.)

Over the last 20 years a great deal of scholarly attention has been devoted to Fascist phenomena; but most of it has been directed to their more obvious manifestations. As a result, we have scores of works dissecting Italian Fascism and German National-Socialism (which is something else again), but little or nothing about Belgian Rexism, Rumania's Iron Guard, Hungary's Gömbösíte movements, or the baker's dozen of similar ideologies and groups that flourished in Third Republic France. Now, however, on the heels of Mr. Colin Cross' handy study of *The Fascists in Britain*, Stanley Payne comes to throw a strong, clear light on the history of the major Spanish Fascist movement: the *Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista*.

This latest and longest of the Falange's titles (the author deals with the others too and with their implications) is also the most revealing. It sums up the original national-syndicalist inspiration of the 1930's merged with the died-in-the-wool traditionalism of the Catholic Carlists, combining radicalism and reaction in an impossible structure destined to (and meant for) ineffectiveness and eventual failure. And failure is the nub of the story Payne tells as he follows the fortunes of the Falangist movement from its appearance about 1931 to its dispirited decline thirty years later: from its source in the resentments and the dreams of obscure, idealistic and immature young men to its echoes in other young men, just as idealistic and immature, just as insignificant and as insecure, in another regime

as rotten and more hopeless than the one they and their ilk had risen in order to oppose.

The book is a case study in the origins, the development and the corruption of fascist movements. First, the failure of conservatism and liberalism, of parliamentary democracy, of liberals and radicals, the predominant sense of corruption and confusion. Against this background, the concern over national unity torn by class divisions, over old ways disrupted by socio-economic change, over values which only social justice and a return to national tradition can secure; the idealistic, almost poetic inspiration that moved the intellectual votaries of fascism, the will to do something—no matter what—which inspired others.

But just because the militants were moved far more by idealism and by the thrill of action than by hope of material gain, such essentially simple movements were fated to be used. Fascism thrives in the mindless democracy of crisis, a derivative in moments of confusion, a façade for the realities of power. It gives reasoners the illusion of effectiveness through action, even if the action consists only of marching around in circles (the fascists create movements, not parties); it gives the power politicians doctrines with which to cover their opportunistic maneuvers. Beneath the Emperor's new clothes, at Burgos as at Nuremberg, lie the same sordid, dreary, selfish shifts and pressures as in the bad old days of the bad old ways which once excited Fascist choler. But the imposing façade attracts the intellectuals and dazzles the crowd: a serious advantage.

Payne has given us an important and suggestive work, lucid, pithy, and wise. He has handled a confused story with skill, making plain the many strands of political, economic and ideological interest which meet, combine and part in the Falange and around it. Not only historians of Spain but students of Modern Europe will welcome his book.

EUGEN WEBER
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BURKE, DISRAELI, AND CHURCHILL. *The Politics of Perseverance.* By STEPHEN R. GRAUBARD. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. 262 pages, bibliographical note and index, \$5.00.)

Stephen R. Graubard has written an absorbing biographical portrait of three outstanding British conservatives: Edmund Burke, Benjamin Disraeli and Winston S. Churchill. Though all three were conservatives, they differed from one another as much as they shared common attributes. The three lived in different periods, when different characteristics for political renown were required.

"Burke lived in a society which made politics the preserve of the aristocracy; political parties were loose combinations expressing family alliances as frequently as intellectual agreements." In trying to use the political party as a vehicle of power and advancement, Burke earned the obloquy of his contemporaries for his partisanship, as well as for his Irish birth.

"With Disraeli, the situation was different. Disraeli understood the uses which might be made of party organization in the realization of his ambitions. In dedicating himself to the Tory Party, in becoming indispensable to its success, he created a niche for himself which a more aristocratic age would never have permitted." Churchill's ambitions were thwarted, until the wartime call to greatness, by an aversion to party regularity.

"... Each was a romantic who lived by a myth, sometimes recognized as such, more frequently incorporated into the basic structure of his thought. These were historically minded men who found in historic example the arguments they required."

Their differences and similarities are developed and analyzed, and what emerge are the political careers and ideas of three great leaders. "In politics each found his work, and in parliamentary combat each sought to excel. Although they differed about the past, and measured the present by standards which derived as often from personal as from political necessities, they agreed in repudiating any system of analy-

sis which made politics appear a science."

A.Z.R.

A GERMAN COMMUNITY UNDER AMERICAN OCCUPATION. By JOHN GIMBEL. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. 259 pages, bibliographical note and index, \$5.50.)

Professor Gimbel of the Humboldt State College (California) has written a valuable study of the effect of the American occupation on a German community. He has several purposes in mind: first, to examine the operation "of an American military government detachment at the lowest administrative level to suggest what an analysis of a larger unit might reveal"; second, to illumine the political thinking "of Americans who tried deliberately to direct the course of postwar German development toward peace, democracy, and free enterprise"; third, to show the reactions of various German groups to the occupation; finally, to show "that in failing to attract a German leadership sympathetic toward the American program in Germany, in fact succeeding in disillusioning what leadership potential of this sort there was, the American occupation gave rise to a strain of anti-American sentiment among even the most democratically inclined Germans and provided them with a convincing rationale for that sentiment."

There is a wealth of detail about everyday life under the occupation. This helps to provide a sense of vibrancy in the narrative. The shortcomings of the American officials are critically presented: poor judgment in appointing Germans to governmental office; an ideological rejection of any German who was tainted in the least way with Nazism, with the resulting alienation from the mass of well-meaning people that this engendered; and an ability to introduce democratization at the grass-roots in a way that would encourage democratic elements to assume responsibility and control once the occupation forces left. There is much original, useful, informative material in this excellent case study.

A.Z.R.

*A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events
of February, 1962, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

- Feb. 2—U.S. State Department officials declare that the Soviet suggestion for a free city of West Berlin with U.N. membership has been turned down.
- Feb. 3—Reliable sources in Washington report that exploratory talks on the Berlin crisis in process in Moscow between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., are deadlocked because of Soviet insistence that Soviet troops be stationed in West Berlin. Gromyko and Thompson had their third meeting on February 1.
- Feb. 9—An Allied statement from Berlin reports that the U.S.S.R. asked for the exclusive use of an air corridor yesterday, and for 2 air corridors today. The Western allies have three 23-mile air routes from West Germany to West Berlin. The Soviet request has been rejected. The Soviet Commandant in East Berlin, Andrei I. Solovyev, is refused entrance to West Berlin by U.S. guards at the Friedrichstrasse crossing.
- Thompson and Gromyko hold their fourth talk since January 2, 1962, on Berlin.
- Feb. 11—A second Soviet request to reserve Allied air corridors for temporary exclusive use is rejected.
- Feb. 12—Soviet flights over the Allied air corridors are cancelled. A Soviet Embassy official denies that the U.S.S.R. sought exclusive use of the lower altitudes of one of the Allied air corridors. He declares that the Soviet Union told the Allied Powers that its "military aircraft would use certain sections of the corridors at certain altitudes at certain times."
- Feb. 15—The U.S., Britain and France tell the Soviet Union that it is taking "the gravest risk" in permitting its military planes illegally to cut across the 3 Allied

air routes to West Berlin and to buzz Allied flights.

- Feb. 22—U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy arrives in West Berlin. He affirms the U.S. determination to defend the city against Russian aggression.
- Feb. 24—In a speech before the national conference of Young Conservatives Associations in London, British Foreign Secretary Home calls for a modus vivendi to ease the crisis over Berlin. He urges negotiation of differences by reconciling recognition of East Germany with recognition of Western rights in West Berlin.
- Feb. 28—A communiqué is issued revealing that Soviet Premier Khrushchev conferred with East German leader Walter Ulbricht in Moscow on February 26-27. The communiqué states that the two leaders have discussed the question of a German peace treaty and the Berlin crisis.

Disarmament

- Feb. 8—The United States and Britain reveal that Britain will permit the U.S. to use the British testing ground at Christmas Island for nuclear tests. They reveal also their suggestion that the Russians should send the Russian Foreign Minister to the 18-nation Geneva disarmament conference to discuss a nuclear test ban treaty.
- Feb. 11—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev writes Kennedy suggesting that 18 heads of government meet to open the conference on disarmament at Geneva.
- Feb. 22—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev suggests that Kennedy meet him at the Geneva disarmament conference; Kennedy refuses. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

The U.S.S.R. indicates it is willing to discuss a nuclear test ban at the 18-nation disarmament conference.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

- Feb. 20—The U.S. requests its Nato allies to

list Cuba with the Communist states with which trade in strategic materials is voluntarily banned.

Organization of American States

Feb. 14—Cuban representatives leave the meeting of the Council of the O.A.S. before the Council acts to make official the resolutions excluding Cuba.

United Nations

Feb. 9—An inquiry commission established by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland reports that the plane crash that killed Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold was caused by misjudgment of the pilots, who flew too low.

Feb. 15—The Political Committee of the General Assembly turns down the Cuban charge that the U.S. is planning aggression against Cuba; a Soviet-bloc sponsored resolution that the U.S. be asked to stop "interference" in Cuban domestic affairs is also defeated.

Feb. 22—U.S. representative Adlai Stevenson asks for a pooling of space efforts under the auspices of the United Nations.

Feb. 23—Despite British opposition, the Assembly votes to inquire into the question of whether Southern Rhodesia has gained "a full measure of self government."

Feb. 24—Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead of Southern Rhodesia warns that it is "quite likely" that the U.N. inquiry commission will not be admitted to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Feb. 25—A United Nations report shows the U.S.S.R. in arrears on its contributions to the regular budget of the U.N.

Feb. 27—The U.N. commission investigating the plane crash that killed Dag Hammarskjold concludes its hearings.

The Security Council rejects Cuban charges that the U.S. threatens aggression.

The U.N. Economic Commission for Africa votes to exclude South Africa from the commission because of its racial policies.

Feb. 28—Andrew W. Cordier, member of the U.N. Secretariat for 16 years, leaves to become dean of the Columbia University Graduate School of International Affairs.

Warsaw Pact

Feb. 1—*Tass* (official Soviet Press Agency) announces that the defense ministers of the Warsaw Pact nations have ended a 3-day meeting in Czechoslovakia.

West Europe (See also France.)

Feb. 10—A report of the Executive Commission of the European Economic Community discloses that the average labor cost for factory labor in the nations of the Common Market is now \$1 an hour including fringe benefits and social security charges, compared with an average hourly cost without extras of \$2.36 in the U.S.

Feb. 16—It is revealed in Washington that in a 5-year agreement, European nations have pledged to buy "substantially more" cotton goods from low-cost producers including Japan. This will ease the pressure of low-cost goods on the U.S.

Feb. 21—The European Space Research Organization opens a 3-day conference; 12 countries plan a \$280 million program.

Feb. 22—A British request that the Common Market allow Britain 4 years before she begins to bring her agricultural policies into line with the Common Market nations is reported in Brussels to have met an unfavorable reaction.

Feb. 23—Common market officials indicate confusion because of Australia's request that she present her own case rather than allow Britain to represent her.

Feb. 28—The Greek parliament ratifies the agreement giving Greece "association" membership in the Common Market.

ARGENTINA

Feb. 2—Argentine President Arturo Frondizi agrees to reverse the lenient stand taken toward Cuba at the O.A.S. foreign ministers meeting in Punta del Este last month. He states that his government will "comply with all resolutions adopted at Punta del Este," including "expelling Cuba from the Inter-American system." Argentina abstained from voting for exclusion at Punta del Este. Frondizi issues his statement after military leaders insist that Argentina should break off diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Feb. 3—Frondizi speaks in Parana. He criti-

cizes the Argentine military who are demanding a tough line on Cuba and the O.A.S. meeting at Punta del Este where the foreign ministers voted to exclude Cuban participation in the O.A.S.

Feb. 28—Argentina formally cancels diplomatic relations with Cuba.

BRAZIL

Feb. 16—Governor Leonel Brizola of Rio Grande do Sul issues a decree expropriating the Companhia Telefonica Nacional, a U.S.-owned subsidiary of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company of New York. The telephone system provides service for Porto Alegre (state capital) and for the interior of Rio Grande do Sul.

Feb. 17—The U.S. State Department announces its disapproval of the telephone company seizure.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Australia

Feb. 6—Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies reveals the Administration's plans for stimulating industry and combatting unemployment; income tax reductions and a rise in unemployment benefits are included.

Feb. 19—A Labor party caucus reelects Arthur A. Calwell as leader.

Feb. 20—Reinforcements are sent to quiet a tax revolt in Buka Island, which is administered by Australia.

Ceylon

Feb. 3—The 17,000-man dock strike ends after 53 days. The Government promises to consider the pay demands of the dock workers.

Feb. 7—The Petroleum Corporation of Ceylon, a government-owned corporation, agrees to purchase some \$700,000 worth of petroleum products from Rumania.

Feb. 26—Ceylon announces that William Gopallawa has been named to succeed Sir Oliver Goonetilleke as Governor General.

Ghana

Feb. 10—President Kwame Nkrumah opens the new Tema harbor.

Great Britain (See also Int'l., Berlin.)

Feb. 6—Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, leaves London for an 11-nation 2-month tour.

Feb. 8—Opposition leaders in Commons attack Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's announcement that Britain plans to test nuclear weapons and will allow the U.S. to use Christmas Island for nuclear tests.

Feb. 25—Bertrand Russell criticizes the Government for planning "global butchery."

Feb. 27—Commons approves an immigration bill restricting immigration of West Indians and Asians. The House of Lords must still approve the bill.

Feb. 28—Britain repays \$210 million of the \$1.5 billion loan borrowed in August, 1961, from the International Monetary Fund.

India

Feb. 16—The third general elections begin; elections will be completed by February 25.

Feb. 22—Grants from the U.S. totalling more than \$53 million for India are announced in New Delhi.

Feb. 26—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's Congress party is ahead in the general elections.

Malaya

Feb. 6—It is revealed in Kuala Lumpur that the Malaysian Solidarity Committee recommends a 5-state political federation with a strong central government. The federation would be made up of Malaya, Singapore Island, and the Borneo territories of Sarawak, Brunei and British North Borneo.

Pakistan

Feb. 8—It is reported from Rawalpindi that 128 arrests were made in Dacca, East Pakistan, yesterday, for defiance of a ban on public meetings.

Tanganyika

Feb. 15—Parliament adopts a motion calling for the establishment of a republic in Tanganyika within the Commonwealth as soon as possible.

BRITISH EMPIRE

British Guiana

Feb. 16—British troops leave London for

Georgetown to help maintain order at the request of the Governor and Prime Minister Cheddi B. Jagan of British Guiana. Feb. 19—After settlement of the 5-day general strike, government workers and others begin to return to work. Two thousand British troops and marines helped to restore order. Some \$28 million in damage is reported.

Feb. 20—in a news conference, Jagan says he plans to establish a national army.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (See also *Int'l., U.N.*)

Feb. 28—British Secretary of State for Colonies Reginald Maudling announces that Britain will initiate a constitutional revision of the elections to the Legislative Council in Northern Rhodesia so that white and African candidates will "have to obtain the same minimum proportion of votes of either race." An opponent of the revision measure, Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation, calls on British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in London.

Jamaica

Feb. 1—A conference opens in London on a new constitution and independence for Jamaica.

Kenya

Feb. 10—Jomo Kenyatta, president of the Kenya African National Union, arrives in London for the constitutional conference.

In London, African leader Tom Mboya asks for "independence within 1962" for Kenya.

Feb. 14—An 82-member conference in London begins to draft a new constitution for Kenya.

Malta

Feb. 19—General elections for the 50-member Assembly bring out a very large vote.

Feb. 21—Labor party leader Dom Mintoff concedes defeat in the general elections.

Feb. 23—The final count in the general elections gives George Borg Olivier's Nationalist party the victory with 25 seats; the Labor party wins 16; the Democratic Nationalists, 4; the Christian Workers, 4; and the Progressive Constitutional party, 1.

West Indies Federation

Feb. 6—Colonial Secretary Reginald Maudling informs Commons of the British Government's decision to dissolve the West Indies Federation, in view of the withdrawal of Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago.

BULGARIA

Feb. 25—Parliamentary elections are held in Bulgaria. A single slate of Communist candidates is offered.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE

(Leopoldville)

Feb. 2—Premier Cyrille Adoula, before the U.N. General Assembly, asks for more forces to help re-establish "national unity" in the Congo, and to complete the ouster of foreign mercenaries from Katanga Province.

Feb. 3—Ex-Vice Premier Antoine Gizenga is removed to a resort village. It is reported that Gizenga remains under arrest, guarded by Congolese troops. The Central Government declares that Gizenga is being guarded only to protect him from other Congolese.

Feb. 5—in two letters from secessionist President Moise Tshombe of Katanga Province to the U.N., according to sources at the U.N., Tshombe agrees to set up joint U.N.-Katanga commissions to supervise the removal of foreign mercenaries from Katanga.

Feb. 6—in an appeal to the Belgian State Council, empowered to act for the new Congolese government as a special supreme court, Tshombe asks the Council to rule on whether or not the central government acted illegally in allowing "foreign armies" to interfere in his province.

Feb. 10—it is reported that U.N. officials and sources in Katanga Province believe that all the foreign mercenaries have left.

Feb. 15—the Katanga Assembly agrees to end Katanga's secession, but it attaches several conditions to its agreement including the demands that the central government take a strong anti-Communist stand and that military operations against Katanga cease.

The U.S. tells Tshombe that it cannot approve his request for a visa to visit the

U.S. next month.

Feb. 16—The Katanga Assembly issues a communiqué on the resolution yesterday ending secession. The communiqué tones down the conditions for accepting the authority of the central government.

Acting U.N. Secretary General U Thant charges Belgian authorities with interfering with U.N. personnel on missions of mercy in the Congo.

COSTA RICA

Feb. 4—Elections for the presidency are held.

Feb. 5—Francisco José Orlich Bolmarcich is elected president for the 1962-1966 term.

CUBA (See also *Argentina*.)

Feb. 4—Premier Fidel Castro reads to crowds in Havana a Second Declaration of Havana, in which he states that "Cuba is for socialism, the United States is for capitalism." He charges that the U.S. ban on Cuban imports constitutes "economic aggression."

Feb. 14—Communist leader Carlos Rodriguez becomes president of the Cuban Agrarian Reform Institute, a post that was held by Castro.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Feb. 8—The Central Committee announces the ouster of Deputy Premier Rudol Barak from the Communist party for "gross violation of Socialist legality" among other charges.

Feb. 15—It is reported that the Communist party's Central Committee adopted a resolution last week to provide "a uniform system of social security for cooperative (collective) farm workers," including "family allowances, sickness benefits, old age pensions," and so forth.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Feb. 17—The U.S. and the Dominican Republic sign an agreement whereby the U.S. will lend \$25 million to the Dominican Republic.

Feb. 21—The Council of State, the ruling military-civilian coalition, declares a state of emergency.

EGYPT

Feb. 11—Yugoslav President Tito confers with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser during Tito's Red Sea Cruise.

Feb. 12—It is announced that a combined U.S. loan and grant to Egypt for \$40 million for the construction of grain storage facilities has been agreed on.

ETHIOPIA

Feb. 15—The Empress of Ethiopia dies.

FINLAND

Feb. 4—Elections for the 200-member Parliament begin. The balloting will continue through tomorrow.

Feb. 10—Incomplete returns reveal that the Agrarian party of President Urho K. Kekkonen has replaced the Communists as the largest single parliamentary group. Finland's 3 left-wing groups, winning 89 seats, lose their majority of 101. The Agrarian party wins 53 seats, the Conservatives 33, Liberals 13, Swedish People's party 14.

FRANCE

Feb. 7—Ten bombs, believed to have been set off by the O.A.S. (French ultra Secret Army Organization), explode in Paris; six persons are injured including a 4-year old girl.

Feb. 8—Leftist demonstrators clash with French security forces in a protest riot against the O.A.S. Eight persons are killed.

Feb. 9—The Socialist party calls for demonstrations to coincide with the funeral of the 8 persons killed.

Feb. 11—Minister of the Interior Roger Frey asks French citizens to maintain law and order.

Feb. 12—Some 10,000 leftists silently march in the Place de la Republique and elsewhere in France to protest against O.A.S. terrorism and the deaths of 8 persons in rioting last week.

Feb. 13—A nation-wide general strike takes effect. Some 1 million persons march in absolute silence to the cemetery where 4 of the 8 victims of last week's rioting are buried today.

Feb. 15—President de Gaulle meets with West German Chancellor Konrad Ade-

nauer at Baden-Baden in Germany, for four and a half hours. A communiqué issued by the two leaders reveals French relaxation of its stand opposing political unity or supranationality in West Europe. The communiqué expresses agreement between Adenauer and de Gaulle that work on organizing the political union of West Europe should proceed. The commission to organize such unity had been unable to proceed because of the deadlock between France and the other E.E.C. members.

Feb. 23—President de Gaulle meets with the 10 regional military commanders in France.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

Feb. 4—French forces in Algerian cities are alerted for possible violence tomorrow following a television address to the French people on the Algerian problem by President Charles de Gaulle.

Feb. 5—President de Gaulle, in a television broadcast, tells the French people that he is hopeful of settling the Algerian war soon.

Feb. 6—A wave of violence sweeps through Algerian cities. 23 are killed. The French army captures 40 armed and uniformed members of the O.A.S. (the extremist Secret Army Organization).

Feb. 9—It is reported that French and Algerian nationalist leaders have reached agreement on an interim government to rule Algeria between the establishment of a cease-fire and the referendum for self-determination.

Feb. 16—Members of the 54-man National Council of the Algerian Revolution begin to arrive in Libya. It is expected that the National Council, the Algerian rebel "parliament," is preparing to debate a cease-fire agreement. Secret negotiations for the cease-fire are presently under way between French officials and rebel nationalists.

Feb. 18—Two rightist French Air Force pilots on training flights in separate planes attack with rockets an Algerian rebel camp at Oujda, Morocco, just over the Algerian border. The French armed forces in Algeria declare the pilots to be "traitors."

They have disappeared.

It is reported that over the weekend, a minimum of 47 persons have been killed and almost 100 have been injured.

Feb. 19—It is reported that French and Algerian rebel negotiators have reached agreement on a cease-fire in Algeria. Each side has returned home to consult with its government.

Feb. 20—12 Ministers of the Algerian Nationalist Provisional Government approve the cease-fire agreement negotiated between Algerian rebels and French representatives. The National Council must next give its approval.

Feb. 21—The French Cabinet approves the "conclusions" reached by Algerian rebels and French officials on an Algerian solution.

Feb. 22—The National Council convenes in Tripoli in Libya to consider the French-Algerian settlement.

Feb. 24—French Delegate General Jean Morin tells an emergency meeting of administration heads in Algeria that a cease-fire could be announced any moment.

In three hours of violence between European ultras and Algerian Muslims, some 25 persons are killed.

Feb. 25—European rightists attack the barracks of the Mobile Gendarmerie, a militarized police force. Extremists' bazooka fire causes a large fire.

Feb. 28—Algerian Nationalist Minister of Information M'hammed Yazid announces that the 6-day meeting of the National Council last night approved the secret negotiations so far worked out with France to settle the Algerian war, and authorized the continuation of negotiations.

GERMANY, EAST (Democratic Republic of) (See *Int'l., Berlin.*)

GERMANY, WEST (Federal Republic of)

Feb. 8—Herman Abs, head of the Deutsche Bank, announces a combined loan by West German banks to Japan for \$25 million.

Feb. 15—Chancellor Konrad Adenauer meets with French President Charles de Gaulle in Baden-Baden (see also *France*).

GUATEMALA

Feb. 15—President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes

announces that a revolt at Bananera on February 6 has been quelled.

JAPAN

Feb. 4—U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, on a 3 week tour through the Far East, is greeted by crowds on his arrival in Japan.

JORDAN

Feb. 8—A British woman is killed by a Jordanian patrol sentry on Mount Zion. The woman was attempting to install a religious banner on Mount Zion, located in the armistice border area between Israel and Jordan.

Feb. 27—King Hussein declares that all exiles who disagreed with the Jordanian government are welcome to return for "a new start."

INDONESIA

Feb. 8—A Soviet statement, made public by *Tass* (official Soviet press agency), warns the Netherlands against sending troops to West New Guinea to protect it against seizure by Indonesia.

Feb. 19—The U.S. and Indonesia sign a 3-year agreement whereby the U.S. will sell some \$93 million worth of rice, wheat, flour, cotton and tobacco to Indonesia. The receipts of the sale will be used for loans for Indonesian development projects.

IRELAND, REPUBLIC OF

Feb. 26—The Irish Army (I.R.A.) announces that its 5-year harassment of Northern Ireland's police stations, customs posts and other terrorist activity against Northern Ireland (part of the United Kingdom) has been terminated.

ISRAEL

Feb. 9—Finance Minister Levi Eshkol announces in a radio broadcast the devaluation of Israeli currency. The new rate is 3 Israeli pounds to the dollar; the old rate was 1.8 Israeli pounds to the dollar.

Feb. 19—The government wins a vote of confidence on its currency devaluation measure.

ITALY

Feb. 1—The Christian Democratic party

congress votes for a coalition government to include Pietro Nenni's left-wing Socialists. It desires Socialist support in the parliament, but does not call for the inclusion of Socialists in the Cabinet.

Feb. 2—Christian Democratic Premier Amintore Fanfani and his Cabinet resign, to prepare the way for a Center-Left government with outside support from Nenni's Socialists.

Feb. 10—President Giovanni Gronchi asks Fanfani to form a new government.

Feb. 21—Fanfani announces that he has formed a Center-Left government composed of Christian Democrats, Democratic Socialists and Republicans with the left-wing Socialist's parliamentary support. The 4-party coalition commands a majority in the Senate and in the Chamber of Deputies.

LAOS

Feb. 1—Communist-led rebels attack an air field at Nam Tha, a provincial capital.

Feb. 2—Prince Boun Oum (rightist leader) declares that the Nam Tha attack cancels talks scheduled for today on setting up a coalition government in Laos. He calls off Prince Souvanna Phouma's meeting with King Savang Vatthana. Phouma has been given the job of setting up a coalition government with himself as premier.

Feb. 3—Neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma urges that Boun Oum and pro-Communist Prince Souphanouvong replace the ceasefire declaration of May, 1961, with a written agreement. Souvanna Phouma consults about the deterioration of the Laotian situation with the International Control Commission on Laos, composed of Canada, Poland and India.

Feb. 4—Soviet and American ambassadors in Laos confer on the worsening situation. Rebel firing on Nam Tha continues.

Feb. 10—Boun Oum refuses to meet with Souvanna Phouma.

Feb. 16—The U.S. State Department announces that U.S. aid payments of \$3 million monthly will be held back for the second consecutive month.

Feb. 18—Prince Souvanna Phouma leaves Luang Prabang after a 2-day talk with King Savang Vatthana and rightist Deputy Premier Phoumi Nosavan.

Feb. 21—Souvanna Phouma and Premier Boun Oum meet.

POLAND

Feb. 3—The United Workers (Communist) party is holding a month's celebration of its twentieth anniversary.

Feb. 15—Poland's *Sejm* (parliament) approves a bill giving the Supreme Court ultimate power. The new Supreme Court is divided into 4 chambers with the power of judicial review over all other court decisions.

PORTUGAL

Feb. 10—Former Army Captain Henrique Galvão, who led the hijacking of the Portuguese liner Santa Maria in 1961, and 32 others are tried in absentia. Galvão is sentenced to 22 years in jail.

SPAIN

Feb. 9—Spain applies for "association" in the European Economic Community (the Common Market).

TURKEY

Feb. 22—Dissident Army units stage an uprising to overthrow the 3-month old government of Premier Ismet Inonu. Since the legislature convened in November, 1961, not a single act has been passed.

Feb. 23—Inonu announces that the revolt has been put down.

Following the collapse of last night's revolt, Colonel Talat Aydemir is accused of being the leader.

U.S.S.R., THE

Feb. 2—The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission reports that an underground atomic test was apparently made by the Soviet Union today. (See also *Int'l., Disarmament.*)

Feb. 4—*Pravda* (Communist party newspaper) publishes a condensed version of a speech delivered by Mikhail A. Suslov, a Soviet ideologist and member of the Party Secretariat and Presidium. Suslov declares that although the West and the U.S.S.R. can avoid war, their two ideologies will always be in competition and peaceful coexistence will not be possible.

Feb. 9—U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thomp-

son and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko hold their fourth talk in Moscow on the Berlin situation. (See also *Int'l., Berlin.*)

Feb. 10—The Soviet Union exchanges U.S. U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers for Colonel Rudolf I. Abel, Soviet espionage agent held by the U.S.

The Soviet Communist party's Central Committee issues a statement stressing its adherence to "peaceful coexistence" with countries "with different social systems."

Feb. 11—The Soviet Union suggests that the heads of state of the 18 governments participating in the Geneva conference on a general disarmament treaty on March 14, open the conference.

Feb. 12—It is reported that *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* (official publication of the Soviet Academy of Sciences) has published an article by Academy Vice-President A. V. Topchiev urging that top scientific posts be filled by younger men in the 35-40 year old age bracket.

Feb. 13—*Tass* (official Soviet press agency) publishes the text of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's letter to U.S. President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan urging an 18-nation heads of government meeting. Khrushchev declares that such a conference might, if successful, "produce a breakthrough in international relations."

Feb. 18—in a short-wave radio broadcast to "the women of America," Mme. Nikita S. Khrushchev calls for peace and a general disarmament program. She speaks in English.

Feb. 21—Premier Khrushchev suggests, in a message to U.S. President Kennedy, that their countries cooperate in their efforts to conquer space.

Feb. 25—it is reported by *The New York Times* that Lieutenant General Aleksandr S. Panyushkin has been put in charge of the Soviet Central Committee's section on relations with Red China. It is believed that Panyushkin is not liked by the Red Chinese.

UNITED STATES

Economy

Feb. 28—The Labor Department announces that the Consumer Price Index shows con-

sumer prices have remained steady for the fourth consecutive month.

Foreign Policy (See also *Int'l., Berlin.*)

Feb. 1—Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy starts a goodwill world tour.

Feb. 3—President John F. Kennedy embargoes almost all trade with Cuba; the ban is to become effective February 7.

Feb. 5—The President confers with Congo Premier Adoula after lunching with him at the White House.

The State Department reveals that "for the time being" United States territory cannot be used by commercial planes carrying Dutch troop replacements to Western New Guinea.

Feb. 6—Young Japanese Leftists disrupt a meeting at Waseda University, Tokyo, where Robert Kennedy is being welcomed.

Feb. 10—U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers is released by the U.S.S.R. in exchange for Russian spy Col. Rudolf I. Abel. Powers has been detained in Russia since his plane was downed May 1, 1960.

On the first leg of a six-nation tour, Edward Kennedy, brother of the President, meets with students in Brussels.

Feb. 13—Kennedy confers with Saudi Arabia's King Saud.

Feb. 14—The President says that he expects United States use of the Dhahran air base in Saudi Arabia to end in April, 1962; the matter was not discussed with King Saud.

President Kennedy asserts that the Administration is as frank as it can be about the war in Vietnam.

U.S. air crews flying propaganda missions in Vietnam are temporarily grounded after 8 servicemen die in a plane crash in a Communist-infiltrated area. (See also *Vietnam.*)

Feb. 17—Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, warns that the United States and the West are getting ready to challenge Communist "subversion and covert aggression."

Feb. 18—Speaking in Saigon, Robert Kennedy states that United States armed forces will remain in South Vietnam until Communist aggression ceases.

Feb. 25—Kennedy writes Khrushchev that a summit conference should be prefaced by "the largest possible measure of agree-

ment" at lower levels of diplomacy. He indicates that heads of government might meet before June 1 to review the work of negotiators. (See also *International, Disarmament.*)

Robert Kennedy discusses Netherlands New Guinea with Queen Juliana of the Netherlands.

Feb. 28—U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy returns to Washington after a month-long trip to 11 countries. He confers with President Kennedy, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

In Washington, unnamed officials report that President Kennedy has decided to go ahead with nuclear tests in the atmosphere; an announcement is expected shortly.

Government

Feb. 1—The President asks Congress to enact welfare reforms to combat "poverty that persists in the midst of abundance."

Feb. 6—The President asks Congress for a \$5.7 billion program of aid for public schools and for colleges in the next 5 years.

Feb. 7—Cardinal Spellman charges that the Administration's program for aiding public education would mean death to parochial schools.

Feb. 8—The President refuses to allow identification of a Pentagon censor for a Senate investigating subcommittee; invoking the doctrine of executive privilege, he holds that disclosure of the censor's name would be "contrary to the public interest."

Feb. 9—The Administration asks Congress to provide all or part of the funds for neighborhood fall-out shelters for 20 million people.

Feb. 10—The President issues new "standards of conduct" for scientific advisers to the Government.

Feb. 16—Some 1,400 college students demonstrate for peace in front of the White House.

Feb. 19—The President asks Congress for authority to spend \$2 billion on public works programs when unemployment figures indicate recession.

Feb. 26—The President asks Congress to permit the Peace Corps to be doubled in size.

Feb. 27—in a special message, the President

asks Congress to establish a self-financed system of health insurance for the aged.

Feb. 28—The 15-man presidential Railroad Commission issues a report calling for revision of wages and working conditions in the railroad industry. A spokesman for the unions declares that the report in effect eliminates some 80,000 railroad jobs.

Labor Problems

Feb. 7—The 170-man wage policy committee of the United Steelworkers sets its main bargaining goals—job and income security—and reveals that formal contract negotiations with 11 steel companies will open in Pittsburgh on February 14.

Feb. 10—President of the American Motors Corporation George Romney says he will try for the Republican gubernatorial nomination in Michigan.

Feb. 14—Negotiations for new steel industry contracts open.

Feb. 24—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. Executive Council unanimously charges Kennedy with being "overly timid" in coping with unemployment.

Military Affairs

Feb. 4—It is announced in Washington that hereafter United States satellites as they are launched will be known by Greek letters, so that the public will know of their launching without forfeiting military secrecy.

Feb. 6—The Army makes public its error of last fall in calling up some Reservists by mistake; fewer than 1,000 are involved and 336 have already been released.

Distribution to the public of a booklet on fall-out shelters begins.

Feb. 8—Tiros IV is launched into orbit.

Feb. 20—Marine Lt. Colonel John H. Glenn Jr. orbits the earth 3 times and returns safely; he is the first American to orbit the earth.

Feb. 21—Replying to a letter from Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Kennedy supports cooperative space projects.

After a thorough physical examination, John Glenn is reported in "excellent condition."

Feb. 23—John Glenn is decorated by the President.

Feb. 27—It is concluded by a special board of inquiry that U-2 pilot Francis Gary

Powers obeyed his orders as best he could when shot down over the Soviet Union.

Feb. 28—Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Roger W. Tubby tells the Special Senate Preparedness Subcommittee which is investigating censorship of speeches by military officers that President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk have set the broad policy outlines to be followed by the censors; he cites Kennedy's inaugural address.

Politics

Feb. 2—Former Army Major General Edwin Walker files as a Democratic gubernatorial candidate in Texas; Walker resigned from the Army after a controversy over indoctrination of troops.

Mrs. Nelson Rockefeller's lawyer announces in Reno that the New York Governor's wife plans to file for a divorce in Nevada.

Feb. 14—Campaigning for governor of California, former Vice-President Richard Nixon asks for a return to "the spirit of the true frontier."

Feb. 15—New York Governor Rockefeller criticizes Kennedy for "a record of broken promises" on civil rights.

Segregation (See also *Supreme Court*.)

Feb. 1—in Englewood, New Jersey, 100 demonstrators stage a sit-down protest at City Hall after school authorities refuse to admit 9 Negro children to a predominantly white elementary school.

Feb. 2—15 persons are arrested after the all-night sit-down in Englewood.

The Connecticut Commission on Civil Rights asks Stamford residents to consider seriously a redistricting plan to end racial, ethnic and economic "imbalance" in high schools in Stamford, Connecticut.

Feb. 4—Englewood Negroes plan a boycott of downtown merchants, continuing their protest against alleged segregation in local schools.

Feb. 5—A federal district court in Englewood is asked to bar the city from "operating and maintaining" racially segregated schools.

Feb. 7—31 additional defense contractors sign pledges designed to give minority groups equal access to jobs and promotions, bringing to 52 the number of con-

- cerns cooperating in the White House "plans for progress" program.
- Feb. 12—In Greensboro, North Carolina, the N.A.A.C.P. files suit challenging racial bars in Southern hospitals that receive federal aid.
- Feb. 13—A Georgia law providing segregated bus facilities is ruled unconstitutional by a federal district court.
- Feb. 16—The Mississippi House of Representatives asks Mississippians to boycott Memphis in nearby Tennessee because Memphis is desegregating lunch counters.
- Feb. 20—In Morristown, New Jersey, it is announced that a predominantly Negro elementary school will become a junior high school in September, 1962; its pupils will be redistributed among the other local elementary schools.

Supreme Court

- Feb. 1—Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren warns that the U.S. must guard against becoming a "garrison state" in which cold war needs might force the sacrifice of individual freedom; he supports the control of the military by the civil authorities.
- Feb. 19—The Supreme Court affirms a 3-judge federal court order holding unconstitutional a Louisiana local option law allowing the closure of public schools as an alternative to racial integration.
- Feb. 26—The Court, in a brief unsigned opinion, orders a Mississippi federal court to expedite the reaffirmation of the right of Negroes to unsegregated trains, buses, streetcars, terminal waiting rooms and restaurants.

VATICAN, THE

- Feb. 2—Pope John XXIII sets October 11, 1962, for the meeting of the ecumenical council of the Roman Catholic Church.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

- Feb. 4—A U.S. helicopter, carrying Vietnamese troops to an attack against Viet Cong (Communist) rebels, is shot down. Other U.S. helicopters with Vietnamese troops aboard frighten rebels in the village of Hung My. The rebels flee without fighting.
- Feb. 6—U.S. sources report that one U.S.

helicopter crashed and burned and 2 others were hit by Viet Cong fire on a mission carrying Vietnamese troops into battle.

Feb. 8—The U.S. establishes a new command in Vietnam, and appoints General Paul D. Harkins as commander. Harkins is promoted to four star general rank for his new appointment.

Feb. 14—U.S. President John F. Kennedy declares that U.S. aid to Vietnam has been increased. He denies that U.S. secrecy on Vietnam is "excessive."

U.S. air flights dropping propaganda materials over Vietnam are halted because of the deaths of 8 U.S. soldiers aboard a C-47. The C-47 was downed by Viet Cong fire.

Feb. 16—High U.S. officials declare that it may take many years to rid Vietnam of Communist guerrillas.

Feb. 24—The Peking radio broadcasts a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement declaring that the U.S. military build up in South Vietnam threatens the security of Communist China. Red China demands the immediate evacuation of all U.S. military personnel from South Vietnam, and a conference to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

Feb. 26—It is reported from Saigon that 2 fighter planes, manned by dissident pilots, fired on the Presidential Palace. President Ngo Diem is unharmed.

Feb. 27—The U.S.S.R., in a message in *Pravda* (Communist newspaper), warns the U.S. that its continuing aid to South Vietnam may result in war for all Southeast Asia.

Feb. 28—The 9 members of the National Assembly's Steering Committee approve a resolution that the government take severe measures to curb "irresponsible elements."

YUGOSLAVIA

Feb. 4—President Tito arrives in Egypt for a visit with President Nasser (see also *Egypt*).

Feb. 5—Yugoslavia announces that France has demanded the ouster of the Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris because of Yugoslavia's support of the Algerian rebel movement.

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